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Some argue that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary (e.g. Ellis, 
2001, 2002 and Bird 2007). By endowing the laws with metaphysical 
necessity it is hoped that a scientific essentialist metaphysic will succeed 
where neo-Humean contingentist accounts of natural law failed by, for 
example, explaining lawful counterfactual support. I argue that the most 
robust account of the metaphysical necessity of the laws requires that i) kind 
membership is born essentially and ii) that alien kinds are impossible. Without 
i) and ii), a scientific essentialist account of laws risks succumbing to many of 
the same criticisms leveled at the neo-Humean account. I argue that the 
scientific essentialist can maintain i) and ii) in a principled manner, consistent 
with their motivations and in line with the strictures of philosophical 
naturalism. The conjunction of scientific essentialism and ii) implies that all 
possible worlds are identical with respect to their laws. This result is a 
positive because it dispels the mystery of metaphysical possibility by 
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[M]odalities in their primary use concern counterfactuals about 
actual objects, and to reintroduce possibilia is to run counter to 
the admonition of Russell that we ‘retain our robust sense of 
reality’. 




































1.1) Outline  
 
The account of natural laws as metaphysically necessary because they hold in 
virtue of essentially dispositional properties is offered as an alternative to the 
neo-Humean view of laws as thoroughly contingent regularities in the 
Humean mosaic of loose and separate matters of particular fact. Proponents of 
this account, which, following Ellis1, I shall refer to as scientific essentialism, 
see it as superior to neo-Humeanism because, unlike that view, it can account 
for the necessity of the laws, the laws’ relationship to counterfactuals and the 
laws’ ability to explain their instances. I further argue that a metaphysic 
according to which the laws hold of necessity and in virtue of the essential 
dispositional properties of natural kinds paves the way for a naturalized 
account of modality whereby science is the primary vehicle of inquiry into 
real possibility.  
 
In what follows I shall look in more detail at the scientific essentialist 
metaphysic and its motivation. I seek to defend the resulting account of 
natural law in the face of some pressing concerns, which threaten to reduce 
the distance between scientific essentialism and Humeanism to the extent that 
both views succumb to the same problems. I argue that in order to resist these 
concerns, the scientific essentialist must strengthen her view by denying the 
possibility of alien kinds – hypothetical kinds instantiated nowhere in 
actuality – and hence by maintaining that all possible worlds are identical with 
respect to their laws. The broadest respect in which I wish to defend a 
scientific essentialist account of natural law is to show that it is 
naturalistically acceptable, which in the first instance I shall do by responding 
to some recent criticisms of scientific essentialism according to which it is 
                                                
1 (2001, 2002) 
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unscientific2. And once scientific essentialism is supplemented with the denial 
of possible alien kinds, I’ll argue that the resulting modal necessitarianism3, 
has naturalistic appeal since it allows the epistemology of modality to be 
assimilated to familiar scientific epistemology4.   
 
In part 1 I address some criticisms of scientific essentialism, which, according 
to Khalidi5, call into question some of its most fundamental principles. By 
addressing these issues I hope to elucidate the doctrine of scientific 
essentialism in more detail and to rebut some preliminary worries that the 
view is unscientific, and unable to maintain the conceptual distinctions it 
requires. I also address Bigelow’s6 concern with Ellis’s formulation of 
scientific essentialism, according to which individuals can persist through a 
change in kind membership7. Following Bigelow, I argue that essentialism 
about kind membership is required to maintain proper distance from 
Humeanism and, furthermore, that an attractive account of essential 
properties8, very much in a scientific essentialist spirit, implies the essentiality 
of kind membership. 
 
In part 2 I discuss two related and particularly intractable problems for 
scientific essentialism. According to one, raised by Lange9, scientific 
essentialism fares no better than Humeanism at explaining the particular 
relation of support in which the laws stand to counterfactuals. This is because 
the essentialist metaphysic itself cannot account for the particular 
counterfactual invariance of the roster of natural kinds and hence the 
particular counterfactual invariance of the set of prevailing laws. The other 
deep problem, raised in essence by Levin10, and further pressed by Khalidi11, 
contends that the essentialist claim to the laws’ absolute necessity, which was 
                                                
2 Khalidi (2009) 
3 Schaffer (2006) and Wilson (2012) ‘s name for the claim that all possible worlds are 
identical with respect to their laws  
4 Following Wilson (2012) 
5 (2009) 
6 (1999) 
7 Bigelow (1999) 





subsequently employed to do significant work, lacks substance. The concern 
is that the essentialist metaphysic cannot rule out the possibility of worlds 
populated by alien kinds, and hence at which different laws prevail to those of 
the actual world. Thus, if at some possible world there exists schmass, which 
is like mass but universally attracted in accordance with an inverse cube law, 
then it seems wanting to say that gravity is necessarily thus and so. One could 
point to a possible world with a force somewhat like gravity, but quantified 
differently, and argue that in virtue of this world with an inverse cube law of 
universal attraction, gravity is not really necessarily thus and so. As Khalidi 
puts it: “The possible world that anti-essentialists describe is a mere 
notational variant of the one that scientific essentialists deem to be 
impossible.”12 I argue that these two problems serve to severely diminish the 
distance between scientific essentialism and Humeanism and hence that both 
views risk succumbing to similar criticisms.  
 
It is apparent, however, that these problems have something in common; an 
appeal to the possibility of kinds and hence laws that are not present at the 
actual world, thus their resolution would seem to demand the denial of such 
possibilities. In part 3 I discuss the proper context in which to deny the 
possibility of those things (alien kinds) that give rise to the problems of the 
previous section.  
 
To just stipulate that there cannot possibly be any alien kinds would be ad 
hoc; the mere fact that this proposal would serve as a patch to scientific 
essentialism would be an insufficient recommendation given strong intuitions 
to the contrary. So I show that the conjunction of three independently 
plausible theses (the Barcan Formula, Actualism and Essentialism) implies the 
impossibility of alien kinds. But while the assumptions that produce this result 
are each independently plausible and attractive, the implication that, say, it is 
not possible that Wittgenstein fathered a child because nothing in actuality is a 
possible child of his13, seems wrong. Advocates of actualism, essentialism and 
the Barcan Formula have typically posited actually existing bare possibilia, 
                                                
12 Khalidi (2009: 92) 
13 Via application of the Barcan Formula.  
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tokens of which are possible children of Wittgenstein. The postulation of bare 
possibilia, which, for example, satisfy the consequent of an instance of the 
Barcan Formula, whose antecedent says that it is possible that there be a child 
of Wittgenstein, seems fruitful insofar as we are interested in validating our 
intuitions on what is generally possible. Hence, bare possibilia seem to play 
an important role in arguments for the Barcan Formula as a metaphysical 
principle – which I require in order to yield the principled impossibility of 
alien kinds.  
 
The problem faced upon introducing bare possibilia is that of saying why there 
can be no bare possibilia in virtue of which it is possible that there be 
schprotons and other alien kinds. Thus I suggest biting the bullet, to an extent, 
and denying the general possibility that there be a child of Wittgenstein along 
with the possibility of alien kinds, since I propose denying bare possibilia and 
retaining a commitment to actualism, essentialism and instances of the Barcan 
Formula. Following Simchen14, I propose instead that it is possible that 
something(s) propagated a child of Wittgenstein. Since, I argue, nothing 
possibly propagated a schproton, or any other alien kind, it is not possible in 
any sense that they exist. Hence the possibility of alien kinds is denied in a 
principled way, absolving scientific essentialism of the concerns of section 2 
and yielding the desired modal necessitarianism. I finish by offering some 
general reasons in favour of modal necessitarianism, which emphasize the 
naturalistic credentials of the view.  
 
 
1.2) Natural Laws as Metaphysically Necessary 
 
Considered most broadly, scientific essentialism is an attempt at a first 
philosophy, a unifying metaphysical picture of reality. My primary concern 
here, however, will be with the account of natural law thus yielded. At times it 
will be useful to contrast scientific essentialism with the doctrine of Humean 
supervenience and the account of natural law (Humean best systems, from 
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now on HBS) yielded by that pass at a first philosophy. Though there are 
other accounts of natural law worthy of independent consideration, most 
notably the nomic necessitation account backed by Dretske, Tooley and 
Armstrong, it would be beyond the scope of this paper to address these other 
views. Ellis15 and Bird16 both provide incisive critiques of nomic necessitation 
and HBS accounts of law seem to have stood the test of time somewhat better 
than the nomic necessitation account. HBS laws have also gained 
considerable contemporary interest due to their role in arguments for 
deterministic chance17: a particularly hot topic in the philosophy of probability 
at the moment. For these reasons, the scientific essentialist account of law 
discussed will be most fruitfully contrasted with HBS accounts where needed. 
Insofar as the scientific essentialist account is able to overcome problems 
faced by HBS accounts, we will have good reasons to prefer scientific 
essentialism; better reasons than if scientific essentialism were to outperform, 
say, nomic necessitation.  
 
Of primary concern to us will be the laws’ necessity given scientific 
essentialism. This is a controversial result but also one, it is hoped, that will 
imbue scientific essentialism with considerable theoretical utility. HBS 
accounts characterize the laws as thoroughly contingent. This is because, in 
true Humean spirit, the doctrine of Humean supervenience18 denies the 
presence of any necessary connections in nature –everything that can be said 
about the world supervenes on a fundamentally nonmodal base, which 
consists just of loose and separate matters of particular fact. Call this 
fundamental-level amalgamation of distinct matters of fact the Humean 
mosaic. The Humean mosaic may nonetheless exhibit regularities in its 
particular matters of fact. The laws, on HBS accounts, are then the theorems 
of the best systematization of these contingent regularities in matters of 
particular fact. HBS laws are contingent because what regularities there are 
and hence what constitutes the best systematization of those regularities is a 
contingent matter. The problems for HBS accounts of natural law shall be 
                                                
15 (2001) 
16 (2007) 
17 E.g. Loewer (2001, 2004), Frigg (2014), Glynn (2010) Schaffer (2007)  
18 E.g. Lewis (1986) 
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sketched in section 2, where I consider the extent to which scientific 
essentialism is equipped to do any better. Scientific essentialism, while a 
supervenience thesis of sorts, yields an account of the laws as metaphysically 
necessary, because the subvenient base contains irreducible dispositions.  
 
By admitting dispositions into her ontology, the scientific essentialist radically 
departs from neo-Humeanism and paves the way for an alternative account of 
natural law, which it is hoped can overcome the problems faced by HBS 
accounts. Roughly, the scientific essentialist maintains that the laws of nature 
hold in virtue of the essential dispositional properties of things. Thus, for 
example, it is necessary that two electrons separated by a distance r feel a 
force described by Coulomb’s law, for if they did not, they would not be 
electrons.  
 
Khalidi has contested that “essentialism encounters some fundamental 
problems which constitute obstacles to integration with science and a 
naturalized account of scientific inquiry”19. Thus it shall be instructive to 
begin by addressing some of Khalidi’s concerns, which are recurrent in the 
literature. In doing so I hope to simultaneously expound in more detail the 
doctrine of scientific essentialism and go some way towards addressing the 
specific worry that the view is unscientific.  
 
 
1.3) Metaphysical and Semantic Necessity 
 
The metaphysical/ semantic necessity distinction is central to scientific 
essentialism. The laws are said to hold of metaphysical necessity, which is 
implied by the fact that the essences of certain natural kinds include 
irreducibly dispositional properties. For example, it is metaphysically (or de 
re) necessary that an electron have charge  
                                                
19 (2009) 
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(-1.6×10-19) Coulombs. This necessity holds of the thing in question, 
independently of our conceptual scheme or use of language, or so the 
essentialist maintains.   
 
To illustrate the distinction between metaphysical and semantic necessity, 
Ellis compares electrons and bachelors. Ellis argues that failure to know some 
part of the definition of ‘electron’ does not amount to a failure to know what 
an electron is, but failure to know any part of the definition of ‘bachelor’ does 
amount to a failure to know what a bachelor is20. Thus, one may not know that 
an electron has charge (-1.6×10-19) Coulombs, and yet she may still know 
what an electron is. If, on the other hand, one did not know that a bachelor 
was unmarried or male, then he would fail to know something that is required 
to distinguish bachelors from other people, and so would fail to know what a 
bachelor is. The suggestion here is that it is a mark of semantic, but not 
metaphysical, necessity that one cannot fail to know any part of the definition 
of a word for a thing without thereby failing to know what the thing is.  
 
However, it is not obvious that we simply define any common terms, 
including ‘bachelor’, stipulatively as alluded to. Given the definition of 
‘bachelor’ as unmarried man, arguably, it is still unclear if, say, the Pope is a 
bachelor or if a widower is a bachelor. Our knowledge of the definition 
appears incomplete since we fail to categorize some individuals as bachelors 
or non-bachelors, whom we nonetheless know all the relevant facts about. 
Conversely, if we did possess an exhaustive definition of ‘bachelor’, then we 
could reasonably expect to be able to classify the Pope as either a bachelor or 
a non-bachelor. Yet, it would be rash to deny that we know what a bachelor is, 
given this ambiguity. This particular way of drawing the metaphysical/ 
semantic necessity distinction fails then because in the case of bachelors as 
well as in that of electrons, we can grasp the concept, i.e., know what 
bachelors are, and yet lack exhaustive knowledge of the definition of the 
corresponding word.  
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Ellis’ emphasis on definitions here would seem to fuel Khalidi’s21 concern 
that the required distinction between metaphysical and semantic necessity 
cannot be maintained. I argue, however, that if instead of focusing on 
knowledge (or lack thereof) of definitions we attend to the methods by which 
we acquire knowledge of kinds, the distinction will be perspicuous. 
Metaphysical and semantic necessities are differently grounded and due to 
this difference in ground, the means by which we discover necessary 
properties of one type differ from how we discover those of the other.  
 
Against Ellis, Khalidi offers the example of the word ‘circle’, where he takes 
the properties of circles to hold of semantic necessity. However, unlike in the 
case of ‘bachelor’ it appears that one may know what a circle is, and yet fail 
to know, for example, the part of its definition that says it is a set of points 
equidistant from a given point. Hence, we have an apparent counterexample 
to Ellis’s criterion for semantic necessity. 
 
We may agree with Khalidi that one can fail to know certain aspects of the 
definition of ‘circle’ without thereby failing to know what a circle is, but as 
argued we ought not follow Ellis’ account of the metaphysical/ semantic 
necessity divide in terms of knowledge of the definitions of words. On the 
other hand, contra Khalidi, we may reasonably deny that the necessary 
features of circles are really instances of semantic necessity. The key, then, to 
arbitrating in favour of scientific essentialism here, i.e. by making the 
metaphysical/ semantic necessity divide perspicuous, is in doing some 
reorientation of the debate. However, it is being assumed that there is indeed a 
distinction between metaphysical and semantic necessity, which some would 
deny22. Thus, when I talk of making the divide perspicuous, I mean to offer a 
way for the scientific essentialist who already admits metaphysical 
necessities, to precisify how they differ from ‘mere’ semantic necessities. It 
would be beyond the scope of the present inquiry to offer an argument for the 
distinction that would persuade those who think that all necessity reduces to 
                                                
21 (2009: 87-90) 
22 E.g. Mackie (1974: 560) 
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semantic necessity, but suffice to note that it is at least standard to distinguish 
the types of necessity in question23.  
 
Ellis’s broader point, from which talk of defining terms is a distraction, is that 
what is true of metaphysical necessity is so independently of us as observers 
and language users. Metaphysical necessities are out there for us to discover, 
hence the appropriateness of scientific essentialism as a metaphysic for 
scientific realism; a world of things with essential, irreducible causal powers, 
is one that we may reasonably expect to interact with and form knowledge of 
via scientific methods. What must be emphasized is that metaphysical 
necessities are discoverable, not by reflection on the social conventions 
embedding the terms involved, but by close inspection of the things denoted24.  
 
The word ‘bachelor’ may not admit of a definition in the crudest internalist 
sense that Ellis would seem to suggest on occasion. But this fact, and 
Khalidi’s purported counterexample, nonetheless fail to undermine the 
essentialist’s ability to distinguish the ways in which bachelors are necessarily 
thus and so from the ways in which electrons, say, are necessarily thus and so. 
The most interesting point to be gleaned from Khalidi’s “counterexample” is 
that the necessary features of circles are discovered in a way more akin to how 
those of electrons are discovered than those of bachelors. But then we may 
dispute Khalidi’s claim that the essential properties of circles constitute mere 
semantic necessities because the means by which we come to know these 
features bear no relevant similarities to the means by which we come to know 
the features of bachelors and other semantic necessities.  
 
I argue, then, that in practice the difference between semantic and 
metaphysical necessity can be discerned by attending to how we come to 
know the necessary features in question: by reflection on social or linguistic 
convention in the semantic case and via inspection of the things denoted in the 
metaphysical case. Inspection may invoke the scientific method, or even 
mathematics, when we are interested in the more general features of the 
                                                
23 E.g. Fine (2002) 
24 Ellis makes this point later in his book (2001: 234-237)  
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thing(s) under consideration. Since science is concerned with how the world is 
(mathematics in the more abstract, general sense), we may further infer that 
metaphysical necessities pertain to some objective parts of reality, which 
echoes Ellis’ more pertinent claim that the difference between de re and de 
dicto (or metaphysical and semantic) necessity is one of ground; the former is 
grounded in the world, the latter in sociolinguistic convention25.  Of course, 
the sceptic about metaphysical necessity will contest our assumption that there 
are any things existing independently of our conceptual scheme for us to 
inspect, so the foregoing does not really constitute a suasive argument for 
metaphysical necessity. Rather, the more modest hope is to persuade one 
sympathetic to the idea that there are metaphysical necessities distinct from 
semantic necessities that the scientific essentialist can indeed consistently 
distinguish between the two.  
 
The sorts of discoveries that can be made about particular bachelors, which 
hold independently of social conventions (for example that they like ready 
meals), will not be essential features of the kind bachelor, nor of the 
individual members of the kind, and so will hold of no kind of necessity. 
Were it discovered that, as it happened, all bachelors liked ready meals, this 
would not preclude the possibility of some future bachelor who disliked ready 
meals. On the other hand, were it agreed that partiality to ready meals was an 
essential feature of bachelors, then this would be a matter of collective 
agreement, as opposed to revelation delivered via the methods of science. By 
contrast, discoveries made about electrons and circles, which hold 
independently of our social conventions, e.g. that electrons have spin ½ or that 
the circumference of a circle is equal to π(diameter), will, I argue, reveal 
themselves to be essential features of the respective kinds, such that all 
possible electrons or circles will have these features. The point to be 
emphasized then is that the metaphysical necessity with which scientific 
essentialism is primarily concerned pertains to the (purported) objective parts 
of the world as opposed to the concepts we employ. It is for this reason that 
the methods by which we discover metaphysical necessities will differ greatly 
                                                
25 (2001: 37) 
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from those by which we “discover” semantic necessities and thus the 
difference between metaphysical and semantic necessity can be clearly drawn.  
 
As a second line of argument for his required metaphysical/semantic necessity 
distinction, Ellis suggests that the definition of an electron is corrigible in a 
way that the definition of a bachelor is not26. Counter to this, Khalidi claims 
that if anything is necessarily true of ‘marriage’ it is so of semantic necessity 
and yet ‘marriage’ is corrigible as illustrated by the extension of the term to 
include same-sex union. Hence, it is not clear that what is necessarily true of 
things whose definition is corrigible is so of metaphysical necessity as 
opposed to semantic necessity.  
 
However, as we have seen, it is plausible that even the definition of ‘bachelor’ 
is corrigible or open-ended since we may have to modify or precisify it if we 
wished to classify, say, the Pope. Thus it seems unlikely that only the words 
for those things that admit of metaphysically necessary features will have 
corrigible definitions. However, the means by which the definition of 
‘marriage’ would be augmented is very different to how that of ‘electron’ 
would be. 
 
If the extension of ‘marriage’ were to be widened to include same sex union27, 
then this could be so for some of the following reasons: it was universally 
agreed that marriage should be so extended, or someone with sufficient power 
decreed that it should be so extended, or a discovery was made about the 
origin of the word – its first use in a religious text or something – which 
meant that its definition did in fact include same sex union. None of these 
options bare any relevant similarity to the means by which the definition of 
the electron may be extended; namely by empirical discovery of some 
previously unknown properties of the relevant parts of the world. Hence, any 
definitional augmentation of words for things that admit of metaphysically 
necessary properties must be independent of linguistic or other social 
                                                
26 Species concepts may well be corrigible. But the scientific essentialist need not maintain 
that biological species are natural kinds.   
27 As indeed has happened in many countries around the world.  
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convention, or indeed of any “discovery” of the word for the thing’s origin or 
previous application.  
 
I argue, then, that the scientific essentialist can indeed maintain the 
metaphysical/ semantic necessity distinction, and in a manner that gives a 
central role to scientific inquiry in uncovering the nature of reality. Though 
the extent to which we define any terms by mere stipulation is unclear, I argue 
that the distinction can nonetheless be maintained by reference to the means 
by which metaphysical necessities are discovered, namely by scientific 
inquiry into the relevant constituents of the world. This difference in means of 




1.4) Individual Essences and Kind Essences 
 
Ellis admits the possibility that an individual persist through a change in kind 
membership28. However, if individuals’ essential properties are qualified as 
essential only qua those individuals’ membership of a particular kind, then 
this would appear to be a position that the Humean could agree with, since it 
would seem to amount to little more than the claim that there are some 
essential properties of properties29. It would nevertheless be possible for any 
individual to exist with dispositions other than those that it actually has, and 
thus to be subject to different laws or no laws at all.  
 
In order to gain proper distance from Humeanism and the problems therein, it 
seems that the scientific essentialist ought to maintain that the individual 
members of natural kinds bear their kind membership essentially. This would 
inject the required de re modality into the theory and allow for an account of 
the distinctive relationship between laws and counterfactuals30.  
                                                
28 (2001: 237-241) 
29 Bigelow (1999: 47) 
30 Bigelow (1999: 48)  
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One may be hesitant to adopt this form of essentialism, however, since it 
appears to conflict with the appearance that something of one kind may 
become something of another kind. Consider the common case of atoms that 
undergo change in atomic number. An atom may become one greater in 
atomic number by beta emission, and thus change from being an atom of one 
element to being an atom of a different element. Many, Ellis included, believe 
that when this change occurs, the former atom does not just cease to exist and 
another atom come in to being at exactly the same place as the first. Rather, 
they wish to say that the former atom has just changed some of its intrinsic 
properties.  
 
Bigelow however, maintains that such intuitions can be explained away: he 
argues that the aggregate of subatomic particles constitutive of an instance of 
a natural kind viz. an atom of an element, at least some of which come to 
constitute an atom of a different element at a later time, is not the same thing 
that it was before, say, the gain of a proton31.  
 
There are further independent reasons to adopt essentialism about kind 
membership, which I shall present now. Ellis’s weak essentialist intuition 
appears primarily motivated by cases involving the kind membership of 
atoms. Thus, the focus of my arguments will be on showing that, despite 
appearances to the contrary, there are good reasons to maintain that an 
individual atom’s kind membership is essential to it. These reasons will 
emphasize the broad cohesion with scientific essentialist motivations of 
maintaining essentialism about kind membership.  
    
 
1.5) Fine and Gorman on Essential Properties 
 
                                                
31 (1999)  
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According to the modal account of essential properties, just as propositions 
may be necessarily true, so may individuals necessarily be a certain way. Thus 
an individual’s essence is how it is of necessity.  
 
However, Fine32 notes some serious flaws in the modal characterization of 
essence. Fine is concerned with the sufficiency of the condition, since it 
deems as among a thing’s essential properties those which intuitively have 
nothing to do with that thing, which is inconsistent with our conception of 
essence. For example, Peter Singer is necessarily such that the number seven 
is prime, and yet seven’s being prime appears wholly irrelevant to Singer’s 
identity. So we would like to resist the conclusion that the primeness of seven, 
among other necessary truths, is an essential feature of Peter Singer.  
 
Fine instead proposes that the essential properties of a thing are those that 
feature in its real definition. He argues that things can be defined in much the 
same way as words: just as defining a term results in a sentence, true in virtue 
of the meaning of that term, giving the essence of an object results in a 
proposition, which is true in virtue of the identity of the object.33 Thus, 
defining a thing is the same as identifying its essential nature. However, 
Gorman34 criticizes Fine on the basis that his notion ‘the real definition of an 
individual’, in terms of which we are supposed to understand essence, remains 
mysterious.    
 
Gorman35 shares Fine’s concerns with the modal characterization, but in 
addition he argues that it fails to distinguish between properties that, while 
born necessarily, pertain to the individual’s identity with differing degrees. 
This, and the obscurity of the concept real definition, motivates Gorman to 
develop his alternative account of essence. Gorman’s account should be 
attractive to the scientific essentialist due to its continuity with actual 
scientific practice in virtue of the central role it allocates science in 
determining the essences of things. According to Gorman:  
                                                
32 (1994) 
33 Ibid. Pg. 13.  
34 Gorman (2005: 281)  
35 (2005) 
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“…what makes metaphysics different from other fields of inquiry has 
something to do with its generality and not with any ability to lay bare a 
stronger kind of necessity in things than the scientist can capture… [the 
metaphysician’s] contribution will not involve saying that the physicist’s ideas 
are beside the point.”36  
 
Gorman’s account of essential properties abides by this naturalistic sentiment. 
Thus it should be of interest to scientific essentialism, which maintains 
continuity with science by allocating a central role to scientific epistemology; 
accordingly science is centrally concerned with revealing the essential 
dispositional properties of things, the resulting necessary laws and thus the 
real constraints on possibility37.  
 
Gorman argues for a class of necessary characteristics that are not essential, 
where characteristics are those things that really characterize an individual, as 
opposed to mere features, which include such facts as there being infinitely 
many primes. According to Gorman a property F of an individual x is 
essential to x iff: (i) it is characteristic of x (ruling out such properties as 
seven’s being odd) and also (ii) it is not explained by any other property that 
is characteristic of x. Thus, if x is a hydrogen atom, then x’s having one proton 
is essential to it, since this fact about x is explanatorily primary, while x’s 
proneness38 to bond, though necessary to it, is not essential since it is a fact 
that is, at least partially, explained by its proton number39. Gorman’s view 
differs to Fine’s in that instead of proceeding from definition to essence, he 
suggests proceeding from essence to definition; science discovers the essence 
of things and then we go on to define them accordingly. This is an account 
                                                
36 (2005: 287) 
37 See part 3. 
38 Gorman (2005: 282) contrasts “proneness” to bond with mere theoretical ability to bond; 
inert gasses, for example, are not prone to bond, since they are neutrally charged and have a 
full outer shell of electrons, but they still can bond, in theory.  
39 Fine distinguishes between constitutive and consequential essence where the latter type of 
essence is a logical consequence of the former. Gorman, however, points out that this is not 
the only way for one feature to be a consequence of another. An atom’s proneness to bond is a 
consequence of its proton number, but is not strictly implied by its proton number, since the 
number of electrons must be taken in to account too. Hence, Gorman opts for the language of 
explanation instead, where to say that one feature explains another is not to imply that it is 
sufficient for the other.  
 20 
very much in the scientific essentialist spirit and, as I shall discuss, it implies 
essentialism about kind membership.  
 
I raise Gorman’s criteria of essential properties so as to show that there is a 
viable account of essence, free of many of the problems faced by the modal 
account, and amenable to an essentialist metaphysic, which implies 
essentialism about kind membership. Hence I offer an independent reason to 
reject Ellis’ weak essentialist intuition.  
 
One concern with the explanatory characterization of essential properties is 
that it threatens to render the essentiality of properties subjective if 
explanatory primacy depends on the interests or abilities of the scientists 
seeking explanations. However, Gorman maintains that he uses the word 
‘explanation’ in its ontic sense, not in its epistemic sense. The relation of 
explanation, for example, between the number of protons in a carbon atom 
and its ability to bond in such and such a way is a real relation that obtains in 
the world and is independent of any scientist wishing to explain, in the 
epistemic sense, the bonding behavior of carbon. Science may be mistaken in 
what it judges to be the essential properties of things, due to a mistaken belief 
about which properties are explanatorily primary. But this does not threaten to 
render essentiality subjective on this account, since there will still be an 
objective fact of the matter regarding which properties are explanatorily 
primary, i.e., which properties stand on the appropriate side, and only the 
appropriate side, of the asymmetrical explanation relation and hence are 
essential.  
 
Given the problems with the modal characterization of essence and with 
Fine’s invocation of the mysterious notion of real definition, I argue that there 
are good reasons for the scientific essentialist to accept the explanatory 
characterization, particularly given the distinctly naturalistic character of 
Gorman’s argument. Gorman is clear that essences are revealed by scientific 
inquiry, which is primarily concerned with uncovering various explanation 
relations. This may be offered as an interesting elaboration on one of the basic 
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tenets of scientific essentialism, according to which the essential natures of 
natural kinds of things are revealed by empirical investigation and that the 
natural kind structure of the world may serve as the truth maker of our best 
science. The explanatory characterization of essences is a fruitful subsidiary 
to scientific essentialism, which provides a reason for the scientific 
essentialist to accept the essentialism about kind membership that I shall now 
show that it implies.  
 
 
1.6) Gorman’s Criteria and Essentialism About Kind Membership 
 
In the case of atoms, it may appear that an individual atom’s kind is 
explicable in terms of another characteristic property of that individual, 
namely, its proton number, in which case the kind that an atom is would not 
be essential to it, given Gorman’s account. However, this is revealed to be 
incorrect. That an individual, x, is a member of the kind carbon and that it has 
atomic number 6 are just two ways of saying the same thing; the latter does 
not explain the former in the way in which the latter (partially) explains the 
proneness of an individual x that is an atom of carbon, to form covalent bonds. 
Arguably, that an atom has 6 protons explains why we would call it an atom 
of carbon because ‘has six protons’ and ‘is a carbon atom’ are synonymous. 
But so long as ‘explanation’ is understood in its ontic sense, as intended by 
Gorman, it is clear that there is no true relation of explanation here. Thus, in 
this case, it is apparent that membership of the kind carbon is essential to an 
individual atom of carbon, since this characteristic of the individual cannot be 
explained by any other of its characteristics (see 1.5).  
 
This is not to say that there can be no explanation of the atom in question’s 
coming into existence in the first place by, say, appeal to nuclear processes in 
stars. Any such explanation would invoke no characteristic of the atom itself 
and so would not undermine the above argument to the effect that what kind 
the atom is, is essential to it. Essential properties of an individual are not 
wholly unexplained, just inexplicable in terms of any other of that individual’s 
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characteristics. This instance of the essentiality of kind membership is an 
important result since it is precisely the case of atoms apparently changing 
kind that led Ellis to his weak essentialist conclusion. 
 
Gorman proposes a theory of essential properties with a distinctly scientific 
essentialist flavor, which elaborates upon the idea that scientific investigation 
reveals the essential properties of things. An implication of the explanatory 
characterization of essence is essentialism about kind membership, since an 
individual’s kind is characteristic of that individual and not explicable in 
terms of any of the individual’s other characteristics. There is, then, available 
to us a plausible account of essential properties and one very much in keeping 
with the convictions of scientific essentialism, which implies essentialism 
about kind membership and so constitutes an independent argument in favour 
of strong essentialism.  
 
 
1.7) Weak Essentialism and the Construction of an Ellis-World 
 
Ellis recognizes that individuals are the bearers of certain properties, essential 
for their kind membership. However, a distinction is drawn between kind-
essences and individual-essences, only the latter, according to Ellis, is 
essential to the individual simpliciter. Ellis maintains that this mere 
essentialism about kinds (as opposed to essentialism about kind membership) 
still endows the laws with the required de re necessity: 
 
“The laws of nature that I call causal laws are all necessary de re. 
The laws in question are straightforward descriptions of the essential 
properties of the intrinsic dispositional properties which fundamental 
things must have in virtue of being the kinds of things they are”40.  
 
Though laws of nature do not derive from the individual essences of things, 
Ellis maintains that this is not to say that their necessity is merely de dicto. 
                                                
40 (1999: 68) 
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Consider the causal law that salt dissolves in water. The Ellisian essentialist 
construal of this law would be as follows:  
 
For all x and for all y, NECESSARILY if x is salt and y is water, then x is 
intrinsically disposed to dissolve in y.  
 
As Ellis stresses, the necessity operator in the above formulation is within the 
scope of the universal quantifier, that is, in the de re position.  
 
If the above causal law were formulated in accordance with the essentialism 
about kind membership (EM), we would have:  
 
For all x and for all y, if x is salt and y is water, then NECESSARILY x is 
intrinsically disposed to dissolve in y.  
 
And if we knew that a was salt and b water, then we could infer simply: 
necessarily a is intrinsically disposed to dissolve in b. The implication being 
that individuals belonging to natural kinds cannot ever change their natures, 
which Ellis is keen to resist.  
 
Ellis is further moved to resist EM by the belief that his weaker version is 
better at accounting for the necessity of laws of nature that do not make 
reference to natural kinds of objects. Consider the following example 
involving the natural kind of property gravitational mass. M1 and M2 are two 
natural kinds; their instances are of mass m1 and m2 respectively. Analogous 
to the Ellisian construal of salt dissolving in water above, we have: 
 
For all x, y and r, NECESSARILY if x is an instance of M1 and y an instance 
of M2 then if the distance between x and y is r then x and y are intrinsically 
disposed to move towards each other with acceleration proportional to m1, 
m2 and 1/r2.  
 
 24 
However, the construal of gravitational attraction in accordance with EM 
would be: 
 
For all x, y and r, if x is an instance of M1 and y an instance of M2 then 
NECESSARILY if the distance between x and y is r, then x and y are 
intrinsically disposed to move towards each other with accelerations 
proportional to m1, m2 and 1/ r2.  
 
This latter construal implies that given x and y are instances of kinds M1 and 
M2 respectively, that x and y have their particular masses essentially41. 
According to Ellis, x and y may happen to belong to natural kinds whose 
instances are of a particular mass, as in the example, and so have their masses 
essentially, but it seems clear that they need not, since we could reconstruct 
the above formalizations for cases where members of M1 and M2 do not have 
their masses essentially.  
 
However, Ellis’s reasoning here depends on the weak essentialist intuition 
that we have suggested he surrender. So long as we bite the bullet and hold 
that kind-essence is contained within individual essence, it should just be 
viewed as an interesting result that sometimes individuals bear their masses 
essentially. On the other hand, and returning to Gorman, in those cases where 
all members of a natural kind have the same mass in virtue of their being 
members of said kind, this property will fall within the class of the necessary 
accident. Members of the kind in question could not but be the mass that they 
in fact are and yet we can account for the fact that this feature pertains to the 
individuals’ identities to a lesser degree than other properties that they could 
not lack because it is explicable in terms of subatomic constitution. Thus we 
can deny that in such cases as the one of concern to Ellis, the individuals 
possess their mass essentially and yet we can also account for the fact that 
they could not be of any other mass. In this case Ellis is apparently 
preoccupied with the flawed modal characterization of essential properties, 
which impels him towards his weak essentialist position.  
                                                
41 Ellis (2001: 241), (1999: 69)   
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It is worth considering at this point whether or not Ellis’ weak essentialism 
nonetheless suffices to provide the desired distance from neo-Humeanism. I 
argue that does not suffice and hence that the case for essentialism about kind 
membership is stronger than that which arises just from considerations of how 
best to characterize essential properties.   
 
The departure from neo-Humeanism is clear insofar as scientific essentialism 
shows how it is that the laws are dependent upon the constituents of the 
world. Ellis’ picture is of a kind of conditional necessity; the laws are 
necessary conditional upon the kinds present. But the laws are not necessary 
simpliciter, nor even conditional upon the individuals present. The question is 
whether or not this species of necessity is equipped to do the work required of 
it?  
 
Humeanism, it is supposed, allows for the possibility of an aggregate of all of 
the same kinds of things as in the actual world but in accord with different 
laws of nature or no laws at all. According to an HBS account of laws, what 
regularities there happen to be in the Humean mosaic, and hence what 
happens to be the best systematization of those regularities, has nothing to do 
with the constituents of the world and indeed the actual regularities may admit 
of no unique best systematization. Ellis thus notes that this contingentism 
allows for the possibility of a Hume world. A Hume world consists of all of 
the same kinds of things as our world and looks the same in all its manifest 
detail and yet has no laws of nature. Any appearance of necessity in the Hume 
world is purely illusory and is in fact brought about by chance. Ellis cites the 
possibility of a Hume world in a reductio against the Humean account of 
laws, claiming that this absurdity shows that Humeanism is deficient when it 
comes to accounting for natural necessity42.  
 
My concern, however, is that by allowing that individuals may persist through 
a change in kind, our world ends up looking something like an 
                                                
42 (2001: 46, 244)  
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essentialistically acceptable Hume world (an Ellis world?). The distinction 
between scientific essentialism and Humeanism then looks rather trivial. An 
Ellis world is one in which the apparently necessary connections between 
individuals and their behaviors are all illusory, since there are no necessary 
connections between the things (individuals) we observe and the kinds of 
things that they are, and it is only in virtue of the kinds of things that 
individuals are that they are said to necessarily behave in such and such a 
way. The problem of natural necessity, which scientific essentialism was 
issued to solve, then just seems to be pushed one step backwards, since the 
proposed metaphysic still fails to account for the necessary connections 
between individuals, which, according to Ellis’ weak essentialism, may or 
may not be of the kinds that they in fact are.   
 
In an Ellis world we can account for the truth of certain counterfactuals and 
necessary connections as they pertain to kinds, but we are deprived of saying 
why such necessities are true of individuals, that is, those things within the 
extension of the kind. For example, Ellis can account for the truth of 
counterfactuals like, “if there were two protons separated by a distance r, 
then they would repel each other with a force proportional to 1/r2”, but he 
could not account for the truth of this counterfactual as it pertained to two 
particular protons. If two specific protons were identified and named, say a 
and b, then without essentialism about kind membership we could not account 
for the truth of, “if a and b were separated by a distance r, then they would 
repel each other with a force proportional to 1/r2”. If there is no necessary 
connection between the individuals a and b and their protonhood, then our 
metaphysic cannot ensure that they will interact in accordance with those laws 
that pertain to protons.  
 
In Part 2 I discuss a similar problem, which arises even if essentialism about 
kind membership is maintained. The moral being that we must think very 
carefully about the details of our metaphysic in order to achieve the desired 




1.8) Incidental Properties  
 
In the case of some entities, it is not clear if their properties are borne 
essentially or accidentally, and it would run counter to the essentialist’s realist 
motivations to offer an account of the divide in terms of context.  
 
Consider the element uranium; we may have two distinct uranium atoms, one 
of atomic mass 235 and one of atomic mass 238. The question then arises as 
to whether atomic mass is an essential or an accidental property. Since a 
uranium atom can be either atomic mass 235 or 238, it seems clear that atomic 
mass is not an essential property of the kind uranium. Atomic mass is, 
however, an intrinsic causal power, and the equation of intrinsic causal 
powers with essential properties is one of the central tenets of scientific 
essentialism. Furthermore, if we consider the things uranium-235 and 
uranium-238 as kinds in their own right, then atomic mass will be essential to 
these kinds. In the interest of avoiding a contextualized account, according to 
which atomic mass is an essential property of an individual qua element of 
uranium-238, but an accidental property qua element of uranium, Ellis 
introduces a third category, incidental properties, designed to deal with such 
cases:  
 
“If a property Q is not essential to a natural kind K, but is essential to 
a natural species of K, then any member of K that has Q has it 
incidentally, and is therefore a member of a natural species of K 
which has Q essentially”43.  
 
Khalidi argues that the introduction of the incidental property category raises 
a problem for essentialism about kind membership44 “if we ask whether 
incidental properties are had necessarily by their bearers and whether their 
                                                
43 (2001: 78) 
44 Which I argue a robust scientific essentialist account of natural law requires.  
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bearers belong necessarily to the corresponding natural kinds”45. If the 
essentialist answers ‘yes’ to the question then it is implied that atomic mass is 
an essential property. However, atomic mass is clearly not an essential 
property of the broad kind, uranium, to which the atom belongs, and to defer 
to the fact that it is an essential property of uranium-238 would be to 
contextualize the distinction in a way that is to be avoided.  
 
On the other hand, if the answer given to the above question is ‘no’, that is to 
say, if the essentialist denies that atomic mass is an essential property of that 
which bears it, then, according to Khalidi, “This negates one of the basic 
planks of the essentialist position, which equates intrinsic causal powers with 
essential properties”46. 
 
Ellis is clear47 that incidental properties are definitely not born accidentally. 
Hence, the only real threat of contextualization comes from the fact that the 
following statements are both true:  
 
1) x is a member of the kind uranium that has atomic mass 238 
incidentally. 
2) x is a member of the natural species of uranium, U238, that has atomic 
mass 238 essentially.  
 
But Ellis maintains that 1) and 2) are logically equivalent. That is, they tell us 
the same thing, not different things depending upon the context.  
 
Given essentialism about kind membership, Khalidi’s concern is that we are 
confronted with two possible answers to the question of whether or not an 
atom of uranium-238 could become, say, an atom of uranium-235, thus 
ceasing to bear the incidental property atomic mass 238, and yet continue to 
be the same atom. Hence, Khalidi argues that the problem of context-
dependence arises. But this is not the case. We can maintain, as Ellis does, 
                                                
45 (2009: 94) 
46 Ibid.  
47 (2001: 78) 
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that the property of having atomic mass 238 is born incidentally, where 
“incidentally” is defined perfectly objectively as above, and also maintain that 
there is a fact of the matter regarding what changes the individual in question 
can persist through.  
 
Identity should not be qualified qua anything. Whether or not an individual 
can maintain its identity through some change is either true or false, not true 
qua such and such but false qua whatever else. For example, if Clark Kent48 
decided never again to become superman, or lost his superhuman abilities, or 
something of the like, we would not ask if he was still the same person and 
then say “no qua Superman but yes qua Clark Kent”. Rather, his real personal 
identity is something that transcends his two egos. We must judge whether 
this transcendent identity, which nevertheless bears some relation to his 
various egos, can be maintained given the loss of one ego. Similarly, the 
identity of an individual atom is not qualified qua its membership of the broad 
kind uranium but also qua its membership of the species uranium-238. Rather, 
membership of these kinds has a bearing on its identity, which ultimately 
transcends the different categories it falls within. With this in mind, I suggest 
that we are not so much faced with a dilemma, but with an open choice: do we 
wish to permit that an individual could maintain its identity through a change 
in atomic mass, or, more generally, where an individual, x, has property P due 
to its membership of a natural species Q of a natural kind K, could said 
individual maintain its identity and yet relinquish membership of Q?   
 
The two possible answers to Khalidi’s question of whether or not incidental 
properties are born necessarily are objectively mutually exclusive. One cannot 
fall back on context dependence to hedge his answer saying “yes, they are 
born necessarily in respect a, but also no, they are born accidentally in 
respect b”. It is true, as Ellis maintains, that the property “having atomic mass 
238” is incidental to the kind uranium but essential to the kind “uranium-
238”, but, there is a definite fact of the matter whether or not “having atomic 
mass 238” is essential to a given individual. Upon the introduction of an 
                                                
48 Both “Superman” and “Clark Kent” are actually alter ego’s of the individual born “Kal-El”. 
But I don’t think that this affects my point.  
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individual, x, who is a member of the kind uranium and the species uranium-
238, the statements about x’s bearing property P incidentally in one respect 
and essentially in another are logically equivalent, as discussed above. Hence, 
one must choose one of two mutually exclusive answers to the question about 
the respect in which x bears P. Any hint of contextualization is only apparent 
as the property in question pertains to different kinds, not to individuals. And 
this context dependence collapses to logical equivalence upon the introduction 
of an individual to whom the property pertains.   
 
So, I argue, that it is not the case, as Khalidi suggests, that when faced with 
his “dilemma”, the essentialist may be tempted to say that natural kinds are 
maximally specific. Natural kinds can be hierarchical, as Ellis argues, varying 
in their specificity, with broader kinds encompassing more specific species, 
which themselves constitute kinds. Yet it will never depend upon context 
whether or not a certain individual bears a property P that is characteristic of a 
species Q of a broader natural kind K, essentially. The individual in question 
will either bear said property essentially or not, but that property will be 
incidental to the individual qua member of the broader kind and essential qua 
member of the species of that kind, but these statements will be logically 
equivalent, and independent of the issue of whether the property is necessary 
for the individual simpliciter.  
 
We are yet to answer the question of whether individual x of the kind 
uranium-238 is essentially a member of the kind uranium-238 and hence 
essentially of atomic mass 238. One may be deterred from answering the 
question in the affirmative due to intuitions similar to those that motivated 
Ellis’s weak essentialism. It may be harder to overcome the feeling that an 
individual atom may increase or decrease its atomic mass via loss or gain of 
neutrons and yet maintain its identity, than to overcome the feeling that an 
individual could persist through a change in proton number. This, I suggest, is 
due in no small part to the fact that scientific inquiry into particular atoms is 
somewhat less concerned with atomic mass than it is with atomic number, 
since the set of interactions explicable in terms of atomic number is far greater 
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than that explicable in terms of atomic mass. Both Gorman and Fine’s account 
of the essential-accidental divide imply that being of interest to scientific 
inquiry is a hallmark of the essentiality of properties. This implication is most 
explicit in Gorman when he says that science seeks the essences of things and 
that we then proceed to define those things via their essences49. Essential 
properties for Gorman are those that cannot be explained by any other 
properties and hence that serve to explain the largest set of characteristic 
behaviours of an individual. So it is implied that scientific investigation of an 
individual is primarily concerned with essential properties since they are the 
most explanatorily fruitful. The implication is also evident in Fine’s concern 
with the modal account’s inability to sieve out those features that intuition 
would dictate are irrelevant to an individual, let alone essential to it; scientific 
inquiry into instances of the kind uranium is wholly unconcerned with the fact 
that there are infinitely many primes.  
 
I have presented some reasons for essentialism about kind membership, but 
even if one was convinced by this stronger claim, they may nevertheless be 
reluctant to admit its applicability to the case of an atom merely changing its 
atomic mass. How, then, does Gorman’s criteria of essential properties 
categorize atomic mass? Atomic mass is clearly characteristic of an 
individual atom x, but is atomic mass explained by any other characteristic of 
x? While it would appear that atomic mass is explicable in more basic terms, 
i.e. by appeal to number of protons and number of neutrons, it is not clear that 
the property of “being an atom of uranium-238” is any less essential than that 
of “being an atom of uranium”. Like I said earlier, it may appear that “being 
an atom of uranium”, i.e., being a member of the kind uranium, can be 
explained by the fact that an atom has 92 protons, but this is not the right way 
to think about it. Having 92 protons not so much explains an individual’s 
membership of the kind uranium, as it is another way of articulating its 
membership of this kind. As Gorman says about an individual x, that is an 
atom of hydrogen, “apart from having one proton, the atom just doesn’t exist 
                                                
49 (2005: 288) 
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at all50”, similarly for an atom, x, of uranium, apart from having 92 protons 
that atom just doesn’t exist at all.  
 
So, granting that uranium-238 is a kind in its own right (as Ellis does) a 
similar thing can be said. An individual, x, of uranium-238, cannot have its 
membership of the kind uranium-238 explained by the more basic properties 
of “having 92 protons” and “having 146 neutrons”, rather the fact that x has 
this particular subatomic constitution is just another way of saying that it is an 
atom of uranium-238, which cannot be explained by appeal to any other 
characteristics of the individual. So we can allow that an individual, x, of 
uranium-238 belongs essentially to the kind uranium-238. However, atomic 
mass simpliciter is arguably explicable in terms of number of protons and 
neutrons, since “atomic mass X” would not appear to be synonymous with 
“natural kind Y” in the same way that “natural kind Z” I argue does appear to 
be synonymous with “having such and such particular composition of 
subatomic particles”. So, on Gorman’s account, atomic mass would appear to 
fall within the necessary accident category. But we should not be concerned 
that atomic mass comes out as accidental, since we do not thus sever the 
connection between essential properties and intrinsic causal powers of 
fundamental particles. The intrinsic causal power in question really arises due 
to the explanatory base of the atomic mass, i.e., the number of protons and 
neutrons, which I have argued is essential to an individual insofar as it is a 
redescription of the kind of which the particle is a member.  It may seem 
surprising that any arrangement of protons and neutrons thus constitutes a 
natural kind, but it ought not, since in actual fact there are limited 
permutations (as dictated by the laws) of proton number-neutron number 
combinations and those that do prevail constitute well-defined atoms or 
isotopes that fulfill the Ellisian criteria for natural kindhood. So Khalidi’s 
“question” is in fact two questions: 1) is an individual atom x of uranium-238 
essentially of the kind uranium-238? And 2) is the individual x essentially of 
atomic mass 238? Which, according to my argument, may be answered 
wholly objectively and as follows: 1) Yes 2) No.  
                                                




1.9) Essences, the Special Sciences and Beyond  
 
Khalidi takes issue with Ellis’s claim that essences are the concern of just 
physics and chemistry, and that the ‘kinds’ of apparent interest to the special 
sciences are not natural. According to Khalidi, Ellis’s conviction is motivated 
by the fact that the special sciences are concerned with relational, or extrinsic 
properties whereas physics and chemistry are concerned with intrinsic 
properties and material constitution.  
 
However, Khalidi argues that if we restrict our attention to EK, the thesis that 
all members of a natural kind, K, must possess one, or a set, of properties if 
they are to belong to K, then there is no way of denying that special science 
kinds, as well as highly artificial kinds, are natural. On the other hand, 
Khalidi argues that deference to EM on this matter, the thesis that every 
individual member of a kind, K, belongs to K in every possible world in 
which it exists, is not viable, since science is clearly interested in kinds not 
individuals. It is further argued that, according to the indistinguishability 
principle, EM fails to hold for some of the most fundamental particles and 
hence that it cannot be invoked to deem fundamental physical kinds natural, 
whilst denying special science kinds this status.   
 
Consider the term ‘glacier’; it refers to a large body of ice in motion due to the 
effects of gravity. The kind glacier can reasonably be thought to have the 
aforementioned properties essentially. Thus the kind glacier fulfills the 
essentialist thesis EK; we cannot deny glacier the status of natural kind on the 
grounds of its failing to concur with EK. What is more, it will not suffice for 
the essentialist simply to admit that the special sciences are centrally 
concerned with natural kinds after all, because so long as we are concerned 
only with EK, what counts as a natural kind can be extended to the point of 
trivialization. Consider ‘the class of things of mass in excess of 60kg’; this 
term denotes, in all possible worlds, all and only those things whose mass 
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exceeds 60kg, thus fulfilling the requirement of EK, since being in excess of 
60kg is that property which every member of the kind has essentially qua a 
member of that kind.  
 
Special science kinds and artificial kinds will, however, fail to adhere to EM. 
For a particular glacier, it will not be that case that that individual is a glacier 
in every world in which it exists, since that individual may exist in a world 
that is slightly hotter, and hence as a flowing river instead. Similarly, for any 
given member, in the actual world, of the class of things whose mass exceeds 
60kg, it seems they could exist in a world and yet be of mass other than 60kg. 
However, Khalidi claims that the essential properties of individuals are of 
minimal relevance to actual scientific practice. Furthermore, Khalidi argues 
that since the indistinguishability principle implies that fundamental particles, 
like electrons, cannot be tagged or labeled, no sense can be made of the claim 
that certain properties are essential to an individual electron. Hence, EM 
apparently fails for these fundamental natural kinds. 
 
The fact that scientific inquiry is unconcerned with the paradigmatically 
metaphysical question of identity, central to EM, does not mean that such 
metaphysical considerations cannot feature in the formulation of scientific 
essentialism. Scientific essentialism is a broad metaphysic, and as such, 
science and practicing scientists will be largely unconcerned with what it has 
to say, unless they are philosophically curious. But that is not to say that it 
cannot, in a sense, also be continuous with science in virtue of its concurrence 
with science and the central role given to scientific enquiry for discovering the 
essences of things.  
 
Many of the tenets of scientific essentialism are metaphysical, and so of 
limited concern to science per se, so it is odd that Khalidi argues against one 
particular feature of the theory on this basis and yet engages in metaphysical 
debate elsewhere in his critique. Actual science is also typically unconcerned 
with the scientific realism-antirealism debate, since it cannot in itself be used 
as a vehicle of inquiry into the issue. But this does not mean that this area of 
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the philosophy of science is irrelevant, or even that it is irrelevant to science. 
Though scientific essentialism is a metaphysical thesis, the respect in which it 
can be thought to abide by the strictures of philosophical naturalism is that it 
emphasizes the role of science as a vehicle of inquiry into the nature of reality 
and cites in support of its metaphysic the scientific image. Scientific 
essentialism proposes a metaphysic which is such as to give science an 
elevated epistemological status, since according to this metaphysic it is 
science which not only gives the best indication as to how things are, but also 
how things must be, since the laws of nature cannot possibly be violated.  
 
Much the same line of argument applies to Khalidi’s concern with EM and the 
indistinguishability principle. Just because we cannot physically label, tag or 
track the history of a particular quantum particle this ought not have the final 
say on what may be said metaphysically about such particles. Besides, the 
interpretation of quantum mechanical phenomena is a controversial topic 
(itself steeped in metaphysics!), hence Khalidi’s espoused interpretation of the 
indistinguishability principle and its metaphysical implications must be taken 
with a pinch of salt so long as our understanding of quantum mechanics is 
incomplete. Thus, the indistinguishability principle is far from conclusive 
evidence against the legitimacy of giving a central role to EM.  
 
 
1.10) Conclusions  
 
For what has been said so far, I conclude that scientific essentialism can 
maintain the distinctions it requires between metaphysical and semantic 
necessity and between essence and accident. I have argued that in order to 
achieve the desired distance from Humeanism, the scientific essentialist ought 
to maintain that kind membership is born only essentially. Furthermore, an 
attractive account of essential properties, very much in an essentialist spirit, 
implies essentialism about kind membership. Indeed it would seem somewhat 
incongruous to let casual intuition dictate on this point, as Ellis apparently 
does, when elsewhere arguments for scientific essentialism typically proceed 
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from considerations of theoretical utility, of which essentialism about kind 







In this section I shall discuss a pair of closely related and deep-rooted 
concerns for the scientific essentialist’s account of natural law. First, 
according to Marc Lange1 the scientific essentialist metaphysic fares no better 
than neo-Humeanism at explaining the particular relation of support in which 
laws stand to counterfactuals. Second, Levin2 and Khalidi3 have maintained 
that the scientific essentialist’s claim to the laws’ necessity lacks substance. 
 
These criticisms cut deep, since they reduce the distance between scientific 
essentialism and Humeanism to the extent that the former risks succumbing to 
the same criticisms leveled at the Humean view. This in turn threatens to 
undermine the very motivations for scientific essentialism, which included 
overcoming the problems faced by alternative accounts of laws4. The issues 
discussed in this section will motivate the supplementation of scientific 
essentialism with the denial of certain general possibilities. The problems 
discussed will not arise if it is maintained that it is impossible that there be 
additional things to those that there actually are. The details of this 
supplementation shall be cashed out in the next section.  
 
 




4 Ellis (2001: 44-47), Bird (2007: 81-90) 
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2.2) Explanation and Counterfactual Support 
 
It is commonly complained that laws as theorems of the best systematization 
of the regularities in the Humean mosaic, are explanatorily anemic in at least 
the following respects: i) they cannot explain their instances and ii) they 
cannot explain the laws’ distinctive relationship to counterfactuals5. Add to 
this a further concern that iii) Humean best systems (HBS) laws appear to get 
the order of explanation the wrong way round6.  
 
An HBS law is identical to some regularity (though not all regularities are 
HBS laws). However, a regularity cannot explain a particular matter of fact 
partially constitutive of its subvenient base any more than the picture that 
emerges from a dot matrix can explain the positioning of a particular dot. 
Rather, particular matters of fact upon which the laws supervene seem more 
apt to explain the law than the other way round. Thus the well rehearsed 
objections to Humean regularity theories according to which i) HBS laws 
cannot explain their instances and iii) HBS accounts get the order of 
explanation the wrong way round, would appear to be two sides of the same 
coin.  
 
These concerns are also closely related to that according to which HBS 
accounts make a mystery of the laws’ distinctive relationship to 
counterfactuals, as I shall go on to discuss. Given the interconnectedness of 
the main problems typically directed at Humean accounts of laws, any 
alternative account ought to avoid all of these closely related problems or risk 
falling into a vicious cycle.   
 
Laws are thought to stand in a relation of support to counterfactuals. By 
which we mean, roughly, that the counterfactuals that we take to be true, or at 
least highly assertable, are so, at least in part, because of the laws of nature. 
Laws imply counterfactuals, it would seem. Little sense could be made of 
everyday counterfactuals if there were no laws at all. Consider; ‘If I were to 
                                                
5 E.g. Swoyer (1982: 209), Fales (1990: 85–87), Armstrong (1983: 40), Bird (2007: 81-90)   
6 Armstrong (1983), Maudlin (2007: 72) 
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drop my pen, it would fall to the ground’, which is (at least) more assertable 
than ‘If I were to drop my pen, war would be declared’, because there is a 
law, namely gravity, which supports the former, but there is no law that lends 
support to the latter. In the absence of laws it would be difficult to say in 
virtue of what there is a difference between those counterfactuals that are true/ 
assertable and those that are not, so swathes of our counterfactual discourse 
would be unintelligible. Put more broadly, there seems to be some necessity in 
nature, which permits inference to what would be the case, because it must be 
the case, under certain pertinent counterfactual suppositions.  
 
On an HBS account of natural law, it is unclear how the prevailing laws 
should support counterfactuals because it is unclear how they are to provide 
the required necessity. HBS laws are contingent regularities, thus there would 
appear to be no guarantee that the law (gravity, say) that would lend support 
to the thought that if I dropped my pen it would fall to the floor would indeed 
continue to hold in the counterfactual situation imagined. Thus, an 
explanation of the laws’ support for counterfactuals appears elusive to the 
regularity theorist because it is far from obvious that laws as contingent 
regularities imply counterfactuals. To illustrate the problem by way of an 
analogy; it may, for example, be a contingent regularity that everyone in this 
room is a philosopher, but that would fail to support the counterfactual: if 
someone were to enter this room, then they would be a philosopher, since a 
history student may stumble into the wrong seminar, or a plumber may come 
in to fix the radiator, say.   
 
The brute fact of the contingent regularity cannot ensure its own 
counterfactual invariance by forbidding such occurrences as the next-person-
to-enter-the-room’s being a non-philosopher, so we cannot be sure that in the 
counterfactual situation imagined it will continue to be the case that 
everybody in this room is a philosopher. But of course, the regularity theorist 
has more to say about which regularities will constitute laws7.  
 
                                                
7 E.g. Lewis (1973, 1986, 1994) Loewer (1996) 
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Unlike in our ‘toy’ example above, the laws will be those regularities that 
feature as theorems of the best systematization of regularities in the Humean 
mosaic, which achieves an optimal strength-simplicity trade off (where 
additional theorems/ laws increase strength at the cost of simplicity). But it 
remains unclear how such details are to provide any explanation of these 
regularities’ support for counterfactuals, particularly given the apparent mind-
dependence of strength-simplicity considerations8.  
 
Bird raises a similar concern with respect to HBS laws’ inability to explain 
their instances. The fact that the laws are distinguished from mere regularities 
by some factor X need not be taken to add ontological content to the laws and 
so need not increase their explanatory power (according to Bird, regularities 
lack the required ontological content to explain their instances9). On the other 
hand, even if it is maintained that X does provide the regularity with 
additional ontological content, Bird argues: “That the regularity is an axiom 
or consequence of the optimal axiomatic system (i.e., has feature X) does 
nothing to change the fact that it cannot explain its instances”10.  
 
To cite a regularity is to offer a proxy explanation of a particular lawful 
instance or a proxy account of the laws’ support for counterfactuals. The 
regularity points the way to an explanation but is no explanation in itself. 
Unfortunately for the Humean, the additional claim that these regularities are 
theorems of the best system does not fill the explanatory gap. The constitution 
of the Humean mosaic is a thoroughly contingent matter, which itself lacks 
any explanation, it just is, and, crucially, could well be otherwise. So we lack 
an explanation as to why certain regularities are theorems of the best system 
and hence why the laws are what they are. Thus, nothing in this metaphysic 
ensures that the laws hold under precisely the range of counterfactual 
suppositions that we expect them to hold because nothing ensures the 
corresponding counterfactual invariance in matters of particular fact. So a 
law’s being a theorem of the best system does not explain that law’s support 
                                                
8 Armstrong (1983), van Fraassen (1989), Carroll (1990) 
9 (2007:88-89) 
10 (2007: 89) 
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for counterfactuals. Similarly, that the laws are theorems of the best system 
does not help them explain their instances, because their instances are matters 
of particular fact, which rather serve to partially explain which regularities 
ought to constitute the theorems.  
 
So the respect in which the concerns canvassed: that HBS laws fail to explain 
their instances and that they make a mystery of lawful counterfactual support, 
are related is as follows. Consider the regular interactions of charges, 
described by Charles-Augustin de Coulomb. Say this regularity has feature X: 
it is a theorem of the Humean best system and is hence considered a law. This 
feature, X, however, does not endow the law with the ability to explain why 
two particular charges, q1 and q2, feel a force described by Coulomb’s law. 
This is because nothing in the information that the regularity obtains, or that it 
has feature X, makes it the case that q1 and q2 must interact in accordance 
with coulomb’s law; q1 and q2 may interact differently, or not at all, given 
Humean supervenience and an HBS account of laws. Sure, in such a case 
Coulomb’s law would not be a law, but it is this contingency of HBS laws, in 
virtue of their dependence on their contingent instances (matters of particular 
fact), which deprives them of the ability to explain those instances and which 
makes lawful counterfactual support a mystery; because there is nothing to 
ensure the prevalence of the law in question in any given counterfactual 
scenario.  
 
What we would seem to require of our feature, X, such that lawful support of 
counterfactuals is intelligible and lawful instances admit of an explanation, is 
that it endow those regularities that would be laws with an appropriate degree 
of counterfactual invariance and that it offer a principled account of this 
invariance. Contrast this requirement with Lewis11, who builds the laws’ 
particular counterfactual invariance into the counterfactual by stipulating that 
invariance in his counterfactual semantics, which is to evade this meaningful 
request for an explanation12. If, however, feature X provided a principled 
account of regularity R’s particular counterfactual invariance and hence its 
                                                
11 (1973, 1979) 
12 See also Bird (2007: 48)  
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status as a law, then an explanation of the instances of R by appeal to the 
invariance and the reason for this invariance of the law that implies these 
instances, will be forthcoming. Furthermore, R will support the relevant 
counterfactuals because it will be assured that R will hold in other relevant 
possible worlds. It is thus the modal character of explanation, i.e., the idea that 
to explain something involves, to some degree, showing why it must be the 
case, that relates the issue of explaining lawful instances to that of accounting 
for lawful counterfactual support.  
 
The fact that these two problems for HBS laws are so connected, I argue, 
shows that we should not seek to reduce or deflate the modal character of the 
laws. HBS accounts go wrong in the first instance by trying to respect Hume’s 
dictum that there is no necessity in nature and hence that the laws are 
contingent. An account of natural law can only respect this contention at the 
cost of severing the link between laws and counterfactuals and between laws 
and explanation.  
 
The scientific essentialist hopes to endow the laws with the requisite 
explanatory ability and to account for lawful support for counterfactuals by 
appeal to their central tenet that the laws hold in virtue of irreducible 
dispositional properties and are thus necessary. It is this necessity, then, and 
the account thereof, which specifies the exact counterfactual invariance of the 
scientific essentialist’s laws. Strictly speaking, the law itself, considered 
merely as a regularity, does not do the explaining, but the scientific 
essentialist metaphysic underpinning the lawful regularities does13, or so it is 
hoped14.  
 
The foregoing was a very brief treatment of a broad topic. It may be argued, 
for example, that HBS laws explain by unifying, since their status as theorems 
of the best system is dependent upon the overall pattern of regularities in the 
Humean mosaic15. It seems doubtful, however, that this strategy would prove 
                                                
13 Bird (2007: 89-90)  
14 Lange disputes this. See below.  
15 E.g. Loewer (1996) 
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fruitful, since interconnectedness of contingent regularities would still fail to 
endow the resulting laws with the required counterfactual invariance, which, 
as argued, is of central importance to the issues of explaining lawful instances 
and accounting for lawful counterfactual support. My main aim in the 
foregoing, however, was to show that the respects in which it is argued that 
laws as contingent regularities are explanatorily anemic are very closely 
related. Thus, an alternative account of natural law ought not succumb to any 
of these deficiencies, which appear poised to viciously feed into one another.  
 
 
2.3) Scientific Essentialism and Lawful Counterfactual Support 
 
In this section I shall examine those features of a scientific essentialist 
metaphysic that it is hoped will account for the relationship between laws and 
counterfactuals. It will be argued, however, that the metaphysic fails to do the 
work required of it in some crucial respects. My criticism builds on that of 
Marc Lange16 by showing how failure to account for lawful support of a class 
of particularly idiosyncratic counterfactuals has ramifications for an account 
for the laws’ support for more commonplace counterfactuals too.  
 
In response to the criticism of regularity accounts according to which HBS 
laws make a mystery of lawful counterfactual support, the regularity theorist 
typically maintains that similarity of laws carries some special weight in 
determining closeness of possible worlds17. But this, it has been complained, 
is ad hoc and unprincipled18. If Lange’s concern goes through, however, the 
scientific essentialist would appear to have to resort to similarly ad hoc 
stipulation herself. Despite this, Lange thinks that scientific essentialism may 
nonetheless prove superior in other respects. But given the interconnectedness 
of the laws’ ability to explain their instances and support counterfactuals, as 
argued above, I suggest that Lange’s concern is somewhat more pressing than 
                                                
16 (2004) 
17 Following Lewis (1973, 1979)  
18 Ellis (2001: 271) 
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he lets on. We should be concerned if an account of laws fails in any of the 
respects that proved troublesome for HBS laws.  
 
The development of a scientific essentialist metaphysic is motivated by a 
desire to provide an account of natural law that can explain instances of 
general laws, which gets the order of explanation the right way around and 
which can explain the laws’ distinctive relationship to counterfactuals. An 
account of laws as holding in virtue of essentially and irreducibly 
dispositional properties is hoped to be sufficient for the task at hand.  
 
There is some subtle disagreement within the literature over how central a role 
natural kinds ought to be given in an account of the laws of nature. Natural 
kinds feature prominently in Ellis’ metaphysic19 while Bird seems to derive an 
account of laws with reference only to natural properties, and Bird denies that 
all natural properties are natural kinds and vice versa20. Lange specifically 
targets Ellis with his criticism, thus in articulating his concern I will lapse in 
to assuming the Ellisian view at times. However, in the interest of 
thoroughness, once the problem is on the table it will be useful to explicitly 
consider it in relation to the subtly different account of natural law provided 
by Bird (section 2.5).   
 
A scientific essentialist account of natural law, articulated as neutrally 
between Bird and Ellis as possible, roughly amounts to the claim that the laws 
of nature hold in virtue of irreducibly dispositional properties and hence that 
the laws are metaphysically necessary. Bird rejects the idea that natural 
properties form a kind, since, he argues, the property negative charge, for 
example, does not form a class of things, it just is the property. Furthermore, 
the class of negatively charged things, including electrons, raindrops and 
balloons, is too diverse to form a kind21.  The role of natural kinds is thus 
diminished on Bird’s account because laws pertaining to natural kinds, 
electrons, say, obtain most fundamentally in virtue of the properties of those 
                                                
19 (2002: 85) 
20 (2007: 208)  
21 Ibid. 
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electrons. Ellis, on the other hand, posits a hierarchical ontology of natural 
kinds encompassing natural kinds of properties and processes as well as 
natural kinds of substances, which he requires for his distinctive physical 
realism22.  
 
Either way, it is hoped that a metaphysic according to which the laws hold in 
virtue of irreducibly dispositional properties (whether or not these properties 
also constitute kinds) will be such that an explanation of the laws’ support for 
counterfactuals will be forthcoming.  
 
Lange offers the following as an example of a counterfactual the lawful 
support for which can be explained by the scientific essentialist metaphysic:  
 
i) If there had been an electron at spatiotemporal location L, 
then a negatively charged body would have been present at L. 
 
Lange concedes that an explanation is available for the support that the law all 
electrons are negatively charged lends to i). Bird, however, denies that all 
electrons are negatively charged is itself any kind of nomic fact23. Bird’s 
claim is that while it is part of the essence of an electron that it is negatively 
charged, this is not a law of nature, just as it is no law of nature that water is 
H2O – water just is H2O. According to Bird, any laws pertaining to electrons 
will be derivative of the electron’s essential properties – charge, mass, spin 
etc.  
 
Given the controversial nature of i) it will be more instructive to consider how 
the laws yielded by scientific essentialism support counterfactuals like: 
 
ii) If individuals, a and b, of negative charges, q1 and q2 
respectively, were separated by distance r, then they would 
experience a repulsive force proportional to the product of the 
magnitudes of their charges and inversely proportional to r2.    
                                                
22 (2001, 2002, 2005a) 
23 Bird (2007: 208) 
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As it happens, the less trivial nature of ii) as compared with i) means that the 
explanation of lawful support for ii) purportedly offered by scientific 
essentialism will be brought into doubt by Lange’s criticism. Thus, in what 
follows it will serve our interests to keep ii) in mind so we may appreciate the 
broader implications of Lange’s otherwise seemingly narrow criticism.  
 
Now let’s see how this metaphysic is supposed to yield an explanation of the 
relationship between laws and counterfactuals, using ii) as our test case.  
 
According to scientific essentialism, the dispositional property, charge, among 
others, cannot be reduced to a categorical property. So the behaviour of 
charged things cannot be explained by some categorical property of the thing 
in conjunction with a law of nature, which is the sort of metaphysic that gives 
rise to the view that laws are contingent. Rather, the dispositional property 
charge is taken to be fundamental and such that Coulomb’s law holds in 
virtue of this property. Thus, any world at which Coulomb’s law prevails is a 
world at which charge is instantiated and vice versa. At no world is there a 
counterexample to Coulomb’s law, i.e. there is no possible world in which 
charge is instantiated but where charges are not disposed to interact in 
accordance with Coulomb’s law. In this sense, scientific essentialism implies 
the metaphysical necessity of the laws24. And of more relevance to our 
purposes, it is this metaphysical underpinning of the laws that specifies their 
counterfactual invariance. As we shall see, however, the laws would seem to 
be invariant under a wider range of counterfactual scenarios than even this 
metaphysic is able to account for.  
 
The antecedent of ii) stipulates two instantiated charges, q1 and q2. It is thus 
guaranteed, given scientific essentialism, that whatever else may be the case 
in the counterfactual scenario, Coulomb’s law prevails because charge is 
instantiated. According to Coulomb’s law, the force between charges is 
proportional to the magnitude of those charges and inversely proportional to 
                                                
24 E.g. Bird (2007: 48-50) 
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the square of the distance between them, thus, ceteris paribus, the consequent 
of ii) is assured. Though a failure to build in relevant ceteris paribus clauses 
to the counterfactual may result in its falsity, it is argued against Humean 
regularity accounts that even with an appropriate amount of ceteris paribus 
qualification, conditionals like ii) may still be false because the HBS law’s 
relationship to the counterfactual remains mysterious25.  
 
Scientific essentialism endows the laws with metaphysical necessity in such a 
way as to ensure their invariance under an important range of counterfactual 
suppositions. Specifically, it assures the prevalence, in counterfactual 
scenarios, of those laws that hold in virtue of kinds or properties posited in the 
counterfactual antecedent. This, it is argued, is the sense in which scientific 
essentialism can account for the relation of support that holds between laws 
and counterfactuals. Hence it is suggested that scientific essentialism 
appropriately cashes out that property, X, in virtue of which a regularity is 
elevated to the status of law, such that lawful counterfactual support admits of 
an explanation.  
 
What this metaphysic cannot do, according to Lange, is provide an account of 
the laws’ support for such counterfactuals as  
 
iii)  If two negative charges, q1 and q2, were separated by 
distance r, then atoms would still have been composed of 
protons and not schprotons26.  
 
iii) is highly assertable, if not true. But, according to Lange, there seems to be 
no specifically scientific essentialist explanation of why it should hold; absent 
is an explanation of the support between the laws and this kind of 
counterfactual. No specifically essentialist explanation is forthcoming as to 
why the roster of natural kinds should be invariant under the range of 
                                                
25 Ellis (1999), Bigelow (1999: 50). Bigelow urges Ellis to explicitly embrace a constitution 
thesis, according to which conditionals constitute dispositional properties, as opposed to 
being merely entailed by them, since even the Humean could accept the latter by building 
enough into the ceteris paribus qualification (1999: 51-52).  
26 Which are like protons except half their mass. 
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counterfactual suppositions that it in fact is. Analogously, the regularity 
theorist would like to assert ii), but as discussed, HBS laws and the underlying 
Humean metaphysic would appear to lack the means to provide an 
explanation of why the law appealed to in support of ii) should remain 
invariant under the counterfactual supposition in question and hence of the 
HBS law’s support for ii).  
 
Of course, the essentialist can say that atoms are essentially composed of 
protons, not schprotons. But this just pushes the concern back a step; how can 
the scientific essentialist account for the truth of: if two negative charges, q1 
and q2, were separated by distance r, then there would have still been atoms 
and not schmatoms, where schmatoms are like atoms except for being 
composed of schprotons instead of protons. The general concern is this; 
scientific essentialism is unable to account for the counterfactual invariance of 
the kinds of things and properties that there are and hence of the prevailing 
laws. No counterfactual antecedent can posit anything in virtue of which it is a 
law that the roster of kinds is what it actually is, and yet the roster of kinds 
would seem to enjoy considerable counterfactual invariance. Scientific 
essentialism cannot, then, explain the particular relation of support in which 
the laws stand to counterfactuals and hence why counterfactuals like iii) 
should hold.  
 
One may respond that it is unfair to demand that scientific essentialism be 
able to account for the laws’ support of such eccentric counterfactuals as iii). 
However, the complaint has ramifications beyond this particularly niche 
respect in which scientific essentialism would appear explanatorily wanting. It 
is probable that Lange’s criticism it is capable of bringing into doubt the 
ability of scientific essentialism to explain lawful support of counterfactuals 
like ii) and others common in scientific reasoning, since that there are protons 
and no schprotons is something held fixed when evaluating more common 
counterfactuals, like ii). If, however, a world did contain schprotons instead of 
protons, who knows what that world would end up like, or if it would be a 
world in which the consequent of ii) follows from the antecedent?  
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The scientific essentialist metaphysic is a holistic picture of interdependent 
fundamental entities and laws, which it is argued is more faithful to the 
modern scientific image of fine-tuned27 laws and a dynamic ontology 
described by quantum mechanics28. My concern, then, is that a world with 
schprotons may not even be a world in which Coulomb’s law is a law. Fixing 
the roster of kinds and hence laws is no mere ceteris paribus qualification, a 
requirement which may be embraced (see 2.4 below). I take ceteris paribus 
qualifications to rule out the hampering of the prevailing-law-in-question’s 
characteristic manifestations in such a way that its support for the 
counterfactual is not reaped, as opposed to simply ensuring the prevalence of 
the law, which is a job for our metaphysic. It seems plausible, given scientific 
essentialist sympathies, that worlds with alien kinds and laws might not even 
possibly admit the law posited by our counterfactual antecedent. If this is 
right, then the scientific essentialist metaphysic cannot even explain why the 
law appealed to is consistent with, and hence prevalent at, the world in which 
our counterfactual is evaluated, and this is precisely what it was invoked to 
do.  
 
Lange considers a response according to which the specific roster of natural 
kinds at a world obtains in virtue of the natural kind the world is considered 
as a whole. But not only does this attempt to find something in virtue of which 
it is a law that there are the kinds that there are seem futilely ad hoc, it still 
requires some assurance that the counterfactual antecedent directs us only to 
worlds like ours, which would appear to be an intolerable mere evasion of the 
problem of counterfactuals. As Lange puts it, when I say ‘if two charges had 
been separated by a distance r, they would have felt a force…’ I do not mean, 
‘if two charges had been separated by a distance r and the world had been of 
the same kind it actually is…’ Similarly, when I say ‘if I had struck the 
                                                
27 I use ‘fine-tuned’ in a non-technical sense for the idea that any change in fundamental 
physical laws, e.g. gravity, the strong nuclear force, etc., would likely lead to a drastically 
different universe. Or, to change these laws and maintain a universe that superficially 
resembled our universe would require the alteration of a whole host of other laws to 
compensate.  
28 Ellis (2001: 52) 
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match, then it would have lit’, I do not mean ‘if I had struck the match and 
kept it dry, it would have lit’. The challenge is to say why the match would 
still have been dry and why the world would have been of the same kind (in 
Ellis’s metaphysically loaded sense of kind) as ours in fact is29. We cannot 
build such facts into the antecedent, which would be to evade this meaningful 
challenge to the notion of counterfactual support. Indeed such stipulation on 
the part of the essentialist would appear vulnerable to the very concern leveled 
at the regularity theorist, according to which it is unprincipled to stipulate that 
large-scale sameness of regularity in matters of particular fact (laws) ought 
carry some special weight in determining similarity between worlds for the 
purposes of counterfactual evaluation.  
 
In their replies to Lange, Ellis (2005) and Handfield (2005) both suggest that 
sameness of natural kinds will contribute significantly to similarity between 
worlds. On a Stalnaker-Lewis account, when evaluating counterfactuals at the 
actual world we should look to the closest possible world to the actual one in 
which the antecedent is realized and see if the consequent holds. The present 
suggestion, then, is that worlds comprising natural kinds, schprotons etc., not 
found at our world, are further away from the actual world than worlds 
comprising only those kinds present at the actual world. This justifies our 
keeping the roster of kinds fixed under a wide range of counterfactual 
suppositions, namely that range of suppositions which directs us to worlds 
within some set of worlds that are relevantly similar to ours. However, that 
sameness of kinds and hence sameness of prevailing laws contributes 
significantly to similarity again does not seem to be something that can itself 
be explained by the essentialist dictum that laws hold in virtue of natural 
kinds/ dispositional properties. No specifically essentialist metaphysic is 
required to explain why worlds with the same natural kinds or properties are 
closer than those with different kinds or properties. To just build a stipulation 
on similarity ordering into the essentialist metaphysic would be as ad hoc as 
the essentialist accuses the Humean of being.  
 
                                                
29 Lange (2004: 231) 
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One may feel inclined to push harder the obvious response; that it is just 
asking too much of any metaphysic that it be able to account for lawful 
support of counterfactuals like iii). But as it happens, the preceding concern 
seems closely related to another leveled at scientific essentialism. Khalidi30, 
following Levin31, contends that the metaphysical necessity of the laws 
according to scientific essentialism lacks substance so long there is a plethora 
of possible worlds, with different natural kinds and hence laws to those found 
at the actual world. Consideration of these issues will lead me to prescribe the 
denial of alien kinds as a supplement to scientific essentialism. The details of 
this proposal shall be explored in the next part, but first I want to consider the 
Lange concern from the perspective of Bird’s account of natural law, which 
does not explicitly reference natural kinds.  
 
 
2.4) Dispositions and Laws  
 
Whereas on Ellis’ account natural kinds are given a central role: “the laws of 
nature are explications of the essential properties of the natural kinds”32, it is 
not obvious that they play any role on Bird’s account. Elsewhere Bird 
tentatively advocates realism about natural kinds, pointing to the difficulties 
that arise in the attempted reduction of sentences with prima facie reference to 
natural kinds33. But natural kinds play a reduced role on Bird’s account of 
natural law given his view that they are something like clusters of sparse 
properties; properties which are not themselves natural kinds, and that it is 
these properties in virtue of which the laws hold. Since Lange’s concern is 
articulated with reference to natural kinds it will be instructive to consider it 
from Bird’s perspective, with an apparently diminished role for natural kinds, 
before considering it in relation to the issue raised by Levin and Khalidi.  
 
                                                
30 (2009) 
31 (1987) 
32 Ellis (2002: 85). This is a result of Ellis’ more inclusive notion of natural kinds.  
33 Bird (2012)  
 51 
According to Bird’s dispositional essentialism no two worlds could be 
identical with respect to instantiated properties and yet differ with respect to 
the prevailing laws. Bird thus derives the natural laws not from natural kinds 
that are essentially characterized by their dispositional properties, as Ellis 
does, but from the dispositional properties themselves.  
 
Prior to the derivation of the laws from dispositional essentialism, we may 
consider a potency34 P with its dispositional essence. Let P stand for negative 
electric charge. The bearer, x, of P is disposed to give some characteristic 
manifestation m (acceleration) in response to characteristic stimulus s 
(moving to within close proximity of a distinct charged object). Bird posits a 
relation of necessary equivalence between dispositions and certain 
characteristic counterfactual conditionals35 such that a dispositional property 
will imply the truth, in all possible worlds, of a class of conditionals, given the 
appropriate ceteris paribus qualifications.  
 
Thus, the ascription of a dispositional property, say P, to an individual x 
implies that necessarily(if x were to acquire stimulus s in circumstances c then 
x would yield m)36. Where c comprises the relevant ceteris paribus conditions 
such that the disposition is not hampered37. The possibility of finks and 
antidotes that would prevent dispositions from displaying their characteristic 
manifestations, and hence the potentially infinite conjunction that could 
comprise c, posed a serious problem for the Humean’s attempted analysis of 
dispositions in terms of counterfactuals. But the dispositional essentialist is 
not trying to analyse dispositions away. The result that dispositions cannot be 
completely analysed in terms of conditionals is embraced then, and it suffices 
for Bird’s purposes simply to invoke conditionals to characterize those 
irreducible dispositions that constitute the ontological bedrock. What is more, 
since the laws hold in virtue of dispositions, those finks and antidotes that 
must be excluded correspond to the ceteris paribus clauses in otherwise 
                                                
34 Essentially dispositional property (2007: 45) 
35 (2007: 43) 
36 (2007: 45) 
37 (2007: 60) 
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universal law statements and thus the dispositional essentialist can account for 
the ceteris paribus nature of the laws38.  
 
The laws may be derived from dispositional essentialism and shown to hold of 
metaphysical necessity as follows. Take any individual x that bears potency P. 
The conditional characterization of P allows us to infer that if x were to 
acquire stimulus s in circumstances c then x would yield manifestation m. 
Since x is arbitrary we may generalize such that for all x, if x bears P and if x 
were to acquire stimulus s in circumstances c then x would yield manifestation 
m. We now have a universal statement that is not accidental and so is lawful. 
Furthermore, since potencies have their dispositional essences in all possible 
worlds, the lawful generalization holds in all possible worlds, that is, of 
metaphysical necessity39.  
 
 
2.5) Dispositional Essentialism and Counterfactual Support  
 
How, then, does Bird’s account of natural law, with reference only to 
potencies, fare in the face of Lange’s concern, phrased in terms of natural 
kinds? Recall the counterfactual  
 
ii) If two individuals, a and b, of negative charges, q1 and q2 
respectively, were separated by distance r, then they would 
experience a repulsive force proportional to the product of the 
magnitudes of their charges and inversely proportional to r2.    
 
Bird’s account of laws as derivable from the dispositional essences of 
properties allows us to account for the laws’ support for ii); it allows us to 
explain why in the counterfactual situation considered the relevant laws would 
a) be invariant and b) given their prevalence, ceteris paribus, ensure the truth 
of the conditional. The potency, charge, is such that if two individuals, x and 
                                                
38 (2007: 60) 
39 Bird (2007: 46, 48) 
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y, were each to have this property and come in to close proximity of each 
other (acquire stimulus s), they would feel a force described by Coulomb’s 
law (yield manifestation m). Charge is essentially such that distinct charged 
objects interact in accordance with Coulomb’s law, i.e., charge has its 
dispositional essence in all possible worlds. Since x and y are arbitrary, we 
can generalize and say that if any two charged individuals, including a and b 
as posited by the antecedent of ii), were to come in to close proximity of each 
other (acquire stimulus s), they would feel a force described by Coulomb’s 
law (yield manifestation m). And it is in this way that the general law lends 
support to the counterfactual. The fact that the antecedent posits two 
individuals with the property charge ensures that the general law prevails in 
the counterfactual situation because it prevails if and only if the property is 
instantiated.  
 
Now reconsider iii): 
 
If two negative charges, q1 and q2, were separated by distance 
r, then atoms would still have been composed of protons and 
not schprotons.  
 
Again, dispositional essentialism supposedly explains why the antecedent of 
iii) directs us to a world in which Coulomb’s law holds, because according to 
that view charge is essentially such that distinct charges interact in accordance 
with Coulomb’s law. Hence any world in which charge is instantiated is one 
in which Coulomb’s law prevails. But dispositional essentialism cannot itself 
explain why iii) ought to be evaluated at a world with the same roster of 
natural kinds as ours, i.e., a world in which there are no schprotons.  
 
The point can be made more perspicuous if instead of stipulating that 
schprotons are half the mass of protons we stipulate instead that they are 
positively schmcharged as opposed to being charged. Where schmcharge is 
like charge except that schmoulomb’s law holds in virtue of schmcharge. 
Schmoulomb’s law is like Coulomb’s law except it is inverse cubically 
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quantified, such that the force between schmcharges decreases with the 
inverse cube of the distance between schmcharged individuals. The point, 
then, is that a dispositional essentialist account of laws cannot explain why the 
roster of kinds nor potencies is invariant under the counterfactual antecedent 
of iii). That the antecedent directs us towards a world with charge and hence 
where Coulomb’s law prevails is consistent with that world also being such 
that schmcharge is instantiated and hence such that schmoulomb’s law 
prevails. Schmoulomb’s law is no counterexample to the necessity of 
Coulomb’s law since it holds in virtue of schmcharge, not charge. Thus 
Lange’s point remains; there is no specifically dispositional essentialist 
explanation of the laws’ support for counterfactuals like iii). In order to 
account for the truth of iii), the dispositional essentialist will have to resort to 
stipulation of some similarity ordering between worlds, which itself cannot be 
justified by appeal to the fact that laws hold in virtue of essentially 
dispositional properties.   
 
 
2.6) More on Counterfactual Support 
 
The inability of scientific essentialism to explain the counterfactual invariance 
of those very things in virtue of which the laws hold is concerning. It implies 
an inability to explain the counterfactual invariance of the conjunction of the 
prevailing laws. The counterfactual invariance of the laws in this broadest 
sense, I argue, is required to account for the relation of support in which any 
given law stands to those counterfactuals we would take it to imply (section 
2.3 above).  
 
That laws support counterfactuals, whereas non-lawful regularities do not, is a 
platitude. Scientific essentialism promised to succeed where regularity 
theories failed by explaining this support. But any such explanation would 
seem to, at least partially, depend upon the absence of any alien laws in 
counterfactual scenarios.  
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The problem can be characterized epistemically by showing how justification 
of our beliefs delivered by science depends upon the fact that laws support 
counterfactuals. Stated thusly, the present concern undermines scientific 
essentialism’s motivation by calling into question its relevance to actual 
scientific practice and contesting its claim to suitability as a metaphysic for 
scientific realism.  
 
Ellis proclaims scientific essentialism’s aptness as a metaphysic for scientific 
realism, arguing that it describes how the world must be in order for our best 
scientific theories to be true; he thus maintains that it accords with actual 
scientific practice better than the alternatives. According to Ellis, given the 
kind of world that science is revealing to us; one whose fundamental nature is 
holistically described by quantum mechanics, a ‘dynamic ontology’ is 
required. Such ontology requires that we assume “that there are fundamental 
processes of various kinds that are not just sequences of instantaneous point 
events whose identities are independent of the processes in which they are 
involved”40. So, contra the Humean world view of loose and separate matters 
of particular fact; a view that failed to explain lawful support of 
counterfactuals, and given the kind of world that science is revealing to us, we 
are to picture the kinds of things that there are as causally connected via the 
laws that hold in virtue of their essential dispositional properties. The 
essentialist metaphysic is motivated by a desire to acknowledge the causal 
interdependence of events that science reveals and hence to ground the 
justification for beliefs that science provides. Contrast this with the Humean 
metaphysic; science may tell us that light will follow a curved path around 
massive objects, but the belief that this will happen is in no way supported by 
a metaphysic according to which all there is, is a vast mosaic of loose and 
separate matters of particular fact. However, if belief in the counterfactuals 
implied by causal connectedness cannot in fact be justified by appeal to the 
essentialist metaphysic, then it is far from obvious that scientific essentialism 
is really any better placed than Humeanism to provide a metaphysic that 
                                                
40 Ellis (2001: 52) 
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explains the justification we have for belief in the predictive and explanatory 
powers of our best science.  
 
As argued above (2.3), I am concerned that scientific essentialism’s inability 
to explain lawful support for those counterfactuals whose truth requires the 
counterfactual invariance of the roster of kinds implies an inability to explain 
lawful support even of everyday counterfactuals, whose consequents do not 
explicitly postulate an absence of alien kinds. Insofar as these ‘everyday’ 
counterfactuals are implied by science, the result is that essentialism fares no 
better than Humeanism when it comes to explaining the justificatory warrant 
that science provides for our beliefs. Our prima facie justification for belief in 
many counterfactuals derives, I submit, from the belief that the prevailing 
laws are invariant under a wide range of counterfactual suppositions. But, as 
we have seen, the scientific essentialist metaphysic itself cannot explain why 
the worlds at which we evaluate counterfactual antecedents should be ones 
that do not differ from the actual world with respect to kinds present and 
hence the prevailing laws.  
 
We would like our scientific essentialist metaphysic to justify a belief in C: if 
two individuals, a and b, of charges q1 and q2 respectively were close to each 
other, then they would feel a force described by Coulomb’s law, by explaining 
lawful support of C. But, in light of the foregoing considerations, we may 
question what exactly our justification for believing C has to do with a 
scientific essentialist metaphysic? The fact that our metaphysic says nothing 
about what kinds and properties and hence laws may be present in other 
possible worlds appears to deprive it of the ability to provide proper 
justificatory grounds for belief in C.  
 
Our justification for believing C derives in part from our imagining a world 
like ours with respect to the roster of natural laws, in which the effects of 
Coulomb’s law are well documented and corroborated. But if nothing in our 
metaphysic ensures that the roster of natural laws will in fact be the same 
under counterfactual suppositions, then as far as our metaphysic is concerned 
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the world, w1, at which C is evaluated may well have some additional, very 
peculiar, prevailing laws, which are such as to make it false that the two 
individual charges in close proximity feel a force as described by Coulomb’s 
law. Intuition cannot be held as a reliable guide to the goings on in such cases. 
Besides the possibility that Coulomb’s law may be inconsistent with the laws 
of w1, a world with different prevailing laws may be such that, although 
charge is instantiated, interactions in accordance with Coulomb’s law are 
consistently hampered, such that counterfactuals like C are always false. 
Maybe in such a world charge is finkish, or antidotes to the dispositional 
property charge abound to the extent that no amount of ceteris paribus 
clauses would suffice to ensure the truth of the conditional. The problem is 
that the essentialist metaphysic itself is lacking because a major justifying 
factor for our belief in C, I have argued, is the further belief that in the 
counterfactual situation the set of laws is the same as at the actual world. And 
whatever justifies this belief, intuitions on a similarity ordering or the like, is 
not grounded in the scientific essentialist metaphysic.  
 
 
2.7) Absolute Necessity 
 
It appears then that the essentialist metaphysic struggles to explain the laws’ 
particular support for counterfactuals. This implies that the essentialist 
metaphysic itself cannot provide a full justificatory ground for our belief in 
counterfactuals, which in turn threatens to undermine its motivation.  
 
That Lange’s concern cannot simply be dismissed as placing too stringent a 
requirement on an account of natural law should be becoming evident from 
the fact that it threatens to undermine an essentialist explanation of lawful 
support even for everyday counterfactuals, common in scientific discourse. 
But there is another, closely related, concern, which I argue ought push the 
scientific essentialist to adopt modal necessitarianism41, as a result of denying 
                                                
41 Schaffer (2005) and Wilson (2012)’s name for the view that all possible worlds are 
identical with respect to their laws.   
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the general possibility of any kinds or properties not present at our world. 
Further, independent, reasons in favour of modal necessitarianism shall be 
presented in part 3.  
 
Levin (1987) and Khalidi (2009) maintain that there is no substance to the 
scientific essentialist’s claim that the laws are necessary42. While essentialism 
implies the lack of a counterexample in any possible world to charges 
interacting in accordance with Coulomb’s law, it says nothing about the 
possible behaviour of schmcharged objects.  
 
Taking a few steps back for a moment, the dialectic between the necessitarian 
and the contingentist goes something like this. The necessitarian maintains 
that the laws of nature are necessarily thus and so; that in all worlds in which 
those things to which the laws pertain are instantiated, the laws prevail and are 
quantified as they are at the actual world. The contingentist, on the other hand, 
maintains that the laws may fail to hold, even in worlds in which those things 
to which they pertain in the actual world are instantiated and a given law may 
be differently quantified across different worlds. The contingentist will 
typically claim that she can conceive of the force between charges being 
proportional to the inverse cube of the distance between them, or that she can 
conceive of a situation in which no law governs charge and hence that 
Coulomb’s law is metaphysically contingent. A typical necessitarian retort 
will be to challenge the contingentist assumption that it is indeed charge that 
is picked out in the other possible world. The intuition, according to the 
necessitarian, if anything tells in favour of its being possible that some 
property be governed by an inverse cubically quantified law. For reasons 
similar to those that Kripke offers in favour of, e.g., gold’s necessarily having 
atomic number 79, the scientific essentialist maintains that charge is 
necessarily such that distinct charges interact in accordance with Coulomb’s 
law, to merely assume that there are charges in another possible world that 
interact in accordance with an inverse cubically quantified law will be to beg 
                                                
42 Levin comes to this conclusion after imagining how Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a 
posteriori may be extended to the domain of natural laws. But the point applies to the 
scientific essentialism presently discussed, as Khalidi shows.  
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the question against the essentialist. Fine acknowledges this point, with the 
example of mass, when he says:  
 
“For how can we be sure that the hypothetical situation in which an 
inverse cube law is envisaged to hold is one in which the bodies 
genuinely have mass? Perhaps they have some other property 
somewhat like mass, call it schmass, which conforms to an inverse 
cube law.”43 
 
However, Even if the contingentist is pressured to rephrase her objection in 
terms of schmcharge and schmoulomb’s law, it is far from clear that the 
criticism loses any of its intended bite. Indeed the mere terminological dispute 
does little to challenge the anti-essentialist claim. As Khalidi puts it:  
 
“The possible world that anti-essentialists describe is a mere 
notational variant of the one that scientific essentialists deem to be 
impossible.”44  
 
For the same reasons as those discussed by Lange in the context of 
counterfactual support, it now becomes apparent that the essentialist is ill 
equipped to deny the possibility of a qualitatively identical possible world to 
that which the contingentist claims constitutes a counterexample to the laws’ 
necessity. The essentialist has no means of denying the possibility of 
schmcharges interacting in accordance with schmoulomb’s law, because 
nothing in the essentialist metaphysic rules out the possibility of schmcharged 
objects.  
 
Ellis contends that the anti-essentialist lacks good reasons for thinking that 
there could possibly be some property schmcharge such that schmcharged 
objects are disposed to interact in accordance with schmoulomb’s law45. 
Indeed, Ellis argues that one’s belief in such a possibility must stem from the 
                                                
43 (2002) 
44 (2009: 92) 
45 In part 3 I argue that much more can be said in favour of this broad sentiment.  
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belief that Coulomb’s law and other laws of nature are contingent and so, he 
maintains, the contingentist begs the question against the scientific essentialist 
in this respect46.  But as has been emphasized, scientific essentialism itself 
cannot tell against the possibility of alien kinds and properties like schprotons 
and schmcharge and so cannot tell against the possibility of alien laws. Thus 
no anti-essentialist assumption must be made and so no question begging 
must be employed in order to argue that there is a possible world in which 
schmoulomb’s law governs schmcharged objects. Indeed, elsewhere Ellis 
concedes that there might be worlds in which there are dispositional properties 
of other kinds,47 an admission that completely undermines the above retort. So 
as it stands we lack any good reasons for denying the possible worlds that the 
contingentist stipulates. And the fact that these worlds are mere notational 
variants of those that the essentialist deems impossible, would appear to 
deprive the essentialist claim that the laws are absolutely necessary of the 
required substance.  
 
On the one hand we can imagine the contingentist pointing to a world in 
which individuals with a property very much like charge are disposed to 
interact in accordance with a law very much like Coulomb’s law, except that 
this law is inverse cubically quantified. In virtue of this possibility the 
contingentist may claim to have provided a counterexample to the necessity of 
Coulomb’s law’s being thus and so. While on the other hand the essentialist 
simply denies the pertinence of this possibility to his claim that Coulomb’s 
law is necessary. But arguably it is difficult to see what else it could mean for 
Coulomb’s law to be contingent than for there to be a world like the one 
pointed out by the contingentist. The best the essentialist can do here is to 
agree to disagree with respect to what is meant by the laws’ modal status. But 
then there is nothing to arbitrate between the differing modal semantics of the 
contingentist and the essentialist. Indeed it would appear that one could adopt 
the essentialist metaphysic and yet allow that the laws are contingent in virtue 
of the prevalence of worlds with alien kinds and laws just slightly different to 
those at the actual world. But then scientific essentialism runs the risk of 
                                                
46 Ellis (2001: 257)  
47 Ellis (2001: 48)  
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doing little more than taking a meandering metaphysical detour only to arrive 
back at a position without the desired distance from Humeanism and thus 
presented with the familiar problems engendered by that view.  
 
The issue can be considered in light of a line of argument in favour of 
counterpart semantics for de re modalities. Against Lewisian counterpart 
semantics and in favour of transworld identity, Kripke questioned the 
relevance of Humphrey’s counterparts to the issue of whether or not our 
Humphrey could have won the election48. Kripke wishes to maintain that it is 
possible that Humphrey won only in virtue of his winning at some other 
possible world; whereas whether or not some similar man in another possible 
world won is irrelevant to what is possible for Humphrey. Counter to this, one 
may reason as follows. Just as an architect may show what is possible for a 
house, say the feasibility of a loft conversion, by building a scale model, so 
may we say what is possible for individuals at the actual world by reference to 
what is true of their counterparts at other possible worlds. It seems reasonable 
to maintain that certain structural similarities between the scale model and the 
actual building make it true that the house could sustain a loft conversion. So 
contra Kripke, what is true of individual b who is distinct from individual a, 
could nonetheless be relevant to a in some way, namely insofar as we are 
concerned with a’s modal properties. Analogously, it seems reasonable to 
maintain, that what is possible for individuals at the actual world is so in 
virtue of how their counterparts are at other possible worlds49. But if what is 
possible for the house is so in virtue of how the scale model actually is and if 
Humphrey could have become president in virtue of his counterpart’s being 
president at some nearby possible world, then plausibly Coulomb’s law could 
have been differently quantified, i.e. it is contingently thus and so, in virtue of 
some relevantly similar law, which is differently quantified at some other 
possible world.  
 
The Kripkean retort available to the essentialist in this contention would of 
course involve denying the relevance of some distinct law at another possible 
                                                
48 Kripke (1972/1980) 
49 Lewis (1968) 
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world to what is possible of an actual law at our world. Or saying that an 
inverse cubically quantified law, schmoulomb’s law governing schmcharge, 
bears no relevant similarity to Coulomb’s law, so it is not the case that 
Coulomb’s law is only contingently thus and so in virtue of how 
schmoulomb’s law is. Similarly, the essentialist may be unmoved by the 
contingentist pointing out a possible world that is a ‘mere’ notational variant 
of one that she claims is impossible, for the essentialist could argue that there 
is no ‘mere’ about it. But then we have a stalemate. To some it will seem that 
a plethora of possible worlds with prevailing laws slightly different to those at 
the actual world will deprive the essentialist’s claim that the laws are 
necessary of substance, while others will deny any relevance of these possible 
laws to the modal status of the actual laws. But brief consideration of why the 
essentialist would wish to include amongst the wares of her argument by 
display the absolute necessity of the laws should convince us that a stalemate 
on this issue is undesirable.  
 
As discussed, much of the motivation for developing a scientific essentialist 
metaphysic and account of natural law comes from documenting the problems 
with the alternative Humean account50. With these problems in mind, the 
viability of scientific essentialism is increased to the extent that it distances 
itself from the Humean alternative. It would be most unfortunate, then, to 
point out all of the problems for the Humean metaphysic only for the 
proposed alternative to turn out to be similarly susceptible to these problems, 
whilst taking a somewhat meandering metaphysical detour. Thus, the result 
that the laws are metaphysically necessary is an attractive feature because it 
serves to distance scientific essentialism from Humeanism. The distance 
between the opposing views is lessened to the extent that the essentialist claim 
that the laws are metaphysically necessary lacks substance. And insofar as this 
distance is diminished, it becomes more likely that scientific essentialism will 
succumb to the criticisms leveled at Humeanism. Thus, from the perspective 
of the scientific essentialist, if her view cannot arbitrate, and if there is no 
other way of arbitrating between different sides of the stalemate outlined 
                                                
50 And to a lesser extent the nomic necessitation view of Armstrong.  
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above, then her argument by display is weakened. However, in what follows I 
shall argue that there is indeed a means of arbitrating this stalemate in favour 







In this part I urge the scientific essentialist to supplement her view by denying 
the possibility of alien kinds. The possibility of alien kinds is integral to the 
concerns of the previous section, so if there are no such possibilities then 
these concerns do not arise. As it stands this proposal is vague. In what 
follows I shall offer a principled context in which to deny these troublesome 
general possibilities. Furthermore, I shall argue that the scientific essentialist 
is particularly well placed to embrace this context and hence that my proposal 
is no mere ad hoc patch that could be just as easily applied to the leaky 




3.2) What is Really Possible? 
 
In light of the forgoing considerations I urge the scientific essentialist to 
acknowledge the damaging implications of merely possible alien kinds for her 
view, and to maintain that, despite appearances to the contrary, there are no 
such possibilities.  
 
It need not be conceded that the alien kinds and resultant laws appealed to by 
Lange, Levin and Khalidi are metaphysical possibilities. What is more, the 
denial of such possibilities need not be motivated merely by a desire to block 
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objections to scientific essentialism. There are some good independent 
considerations that tell against the possibility of schprotons and their ilk, 
which I shall go on to discuss in some detail. But most generally, I suggest 
that the haste with which some are keen to admit all sorts of exotic 
possibilities stems from an outdated view of conceivability as a reliable guide 
to possibility and hence of possibility as cheap. But this conception of 
possibility is one that we need not accept. And indeed there are good reasons 
to reject it. For example, Ruth Barcan Marcus maintains that:  
 
“Modalities in their primary use concern counterfactuals about actual 
objects, and to reintroduce possibilia is to run counter to the 
admonition of Russell that we ‘retain our robust sense of reality’”1. 
 
A plausible interpretation of Marcus here, and one very much in a scientific 
essentialist spirit, garners that philosophical interest in modality should be 
concerned with the way the actual things could be differently configured.  
 
Given scientific essentialism, we may come to know the way things could or 
could not be via science, which is centrally concerned with uncovering the 
essences of the most fundamental constituents of reality. From this, we can 
infer the universal laws, and it is in this respect that we should be concerned 
with matters modal, since it is these laws that really tell us how things could 
or could not possibly be and which guide our counterfactual judgements. 
Thus, real possibilities are constrained by how the actual things could possibly 
be and our modal discourse can be thought to be true or false in virtue of what 
is really possible for actual things, as opposed to what we can imagine to be 
the case.  
 
Adherence to the Russellian admonition (with respect to modality) that we 
retain a robust sense of reality2 should come naturally to the scientific 
essentialist, according to whom the actual things are of central importance to 
what is really possible in virtue of their essential and irreducible dispositional 
                                                
1 Marcus (1995). Also see Russell (1919:152).  
2 See Russell (1919), Simchen (2006, 2013).  
 65 
properties3. The scientific essentialist will accordingly deny, e.g., that there is 
a possible world in which two electrons feel a repulsive force that is inversely 
proportional to the cube of the distance between them. The reasoning behind 
this makes no appeal to what is or is not imaginable; rather it is the essence of 
electrons, which prohibits any such possibility. Thus the scientific essentialist 
should resist sweeping assertions of possibility with no witness in what is 
possible for some tangible part of actuality, since her actuality provides the 
most principled restriction on possibility.  
 
So modality de re is to be given primacy over modality de dicto in the order 
of metaphysical explanation, with the implication that possibility in general 
depends upon what is possible for the actual things. This then provides 
justification for denying the general possibility of alien kinds, because these 
purported “possibilities” have no witness in actuality, robustly construed – 
nothing is a possible schproton. Marcus also suggests, in the passage above, 
that when we think of possibility as cheap, and thus as having nothing to do 
with the way the actual things are, we must resort to talk about mere 
possibilia in order to ground such possibilities, which is to engender 
commitment to peculiar metaphysical postulates with no relation to a robust 
reality4. Thus, if commitment to metaphysical entities makes us 
uncomfortable, then we may deny the possibility of schprotons and other alien 
kinds in the interest of resisting an appeal to mere possibilia.  
 
By contrast, certain non-actual relational kinds, for example, such as the 
possibility that I own a car, will not be ruled out by these strictures, nor will 
they demand recourse to mere possibilia, since any of the actual cars may 
stand in as a possible car of mine5. So to reiterate, it is suggested that the 
constituents of the actual world sustain real possibilities and insofar as a 
purported possibility is not so sustained, it constitutes no possibility at all. We 
                                                
3 Compare this to the Humean who denies that there is any necessity in nature and maintains 
that everything is, at bottom, categorical.  
4 Ellis (2001: 40) makes a similar point, according to which if we deny that natural necessities 
exist in the actual world then short of denying natural necessity altogether, we must find a 
basis for them in some other reality.  
5 Well, a Porsche may not even be a possible car of mine! 
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thus have a reason to deny the possibility of alien kinds: because these 
purported possibilities are not sustained by actuality, and science, concerned 
as it is with the actual world and its constituents, is given a central standing in 
the epistemology of modality.  
 
I argue, then, that the spirit of scientific essentialism warrants a commitment 
to instances of the Barcan Formula (BF): ◊∃xAx → ∃x◊Ax6 as a metaphysical 
principle, interpreted such as to imply the impossibility of alien kinds. In what 
follows I shall develop this idea with more rigor by presenting some logical 
and metaphysical considerations in favour of a commitment to instances of 
(BF) and by discussing the fullest context in which (BF) may imply the 
impossibility of alien kinds. Insofar as these considerations are independently 
plausible, the scientific essentialist will have a principled context in which to 
deny those possibilities that proved problematic for her view. But first I shall 
give a provisional sketch of how the impossibility of alien kinds is to 
overcome the concerns of the previous section.  
 
 
3.3) A Response to Lange, Levin and Khalidi 
 
Recall Lange’s concern was that scientific essentialism could not account for 
the particular relation of support in which the laws stood to counterfactuals 
because it could not itself explain why it is true that if there had been an 
electron at spatiotemporal location L, atomic nuclei would still have 
contained protons and not schprotons. But the current proposal (of which the 
above is just a brief sketch, the remainder of this essay shall comprise the 
details) is, contrary to Lange’s assumption, that there are no metaphysically 
possible worlds at which there are schprotons, or any other alien kinds for that 
matter.  
 
                                                
6 In words: if it is possible that something satisfy a condition, A, then something possibly 
satisfies A.  
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The general possibility of schprotons, say, has nothing to do with possible 
configurations of the actual things, and so may reasonably be denied in the 
interest of avoiding an appeal to exotic mere possibilia and hence losing grip 
on a robust sense of reality in matters modal. Hence, if there were an electron 
at L atomic nuclei would not have contained schprotons because it is not 
possible that there be such things as shprotons. No question arises as to why 
the counterfactual antecedent should point us to worlds without schprotons 
because all worlds lack schprotons. So there really is no burden of 
explanation on the scientific essentialist because there is nothing to explain.  
 
According to scientific essentialism, the laws hold in virtue of the essential 
dispositional properties of natural kinds. So if there is no possibility in which 
there are natural kinds other than those that there actually are7, then there is no 
possibility in which there are any laws other than those that there actually are. 
The current proposal addresses the concern of Levin and Khalidi by doing 
away with the possibility of laws different from those in actuality, in virtue of 
which it would seem that the laws are really only contingently thus and so. 
The scientific essentialist ontology implies that the laws admit of no counter 
examples, which in conjunction with the impossibility of alien kinds implies 
the absolute necessity of the laws.  
 
In what follows I shall explore in detail the context in which to deny the 
possibility of alien kinds. This will involve looking at arguments for The 
Barcan Formula as a metaphysical principle and candidate semantics that 
would underpin such commitment. Once these details are in place I shall be 
able to address more fully the question of how the proposed principled denial 
of alien kinds is to address the concerns of Lange, Levin and Khalidi.  
 
 
                                                
7 Presumably some instantiated alien property would constitute an alien kind. Thus the 
argument can be framed with reference to natural/alien kinds and remain relevant to Bird’s 
account of natural law with its emphasis on properties over of kinds. Bird nonetheless thinks 
it likely that properties will lawfully be instantiated in particular clusters, with precise 
boundaries at the fundamental level, and that this lawful pattern of coinstantiated properties 
will correspond to a natural kind ontology (2007: 208).  
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3.4) The Proper Context of Necessitarianism  
 
Prior to any detailed semantic considerations, the conjunction of three highly 
attractive theses: actualism, essentialism and The Barcan Formula, would 
seem to imply the impossibility of alien kinds and thus would appear to 
constitute a principled context in which to deny their possibility.  
 
The Barcan Formula is derivable from the simplest, most sensible 
axiomatization of quantified modal logic8 and was first introduced as a 
schema by Ruth Barcan Marcus9. Essentialism is just the familiar (given our 
broader concerns) and plausible view that there are some properties of some 
things that those things could not possibly lack. Actualism is the view that 
everything is actual, where the scope of everything is completely unrestricted. 
Thus actualism amounts to the claim that there is no division of existence into 
modes, contrary to possibilism, according to which the mode of existence of 
some things is that of actually existing whereas others exist, but merely 
possibly. Given good metaphysical and logical reasons for a commitment to 
instances of the Barcan Formula10, the intuitive appeal of actualism, and a 
prior commitment to essentialism, the scientific essentialist would appear to 
have a good context in which to deny the possibility of alien kinds.    
 
Consider the Barcan Formula: 
 
(BF) ◊∃xAx → ∃x◊Ax  
 
Letting A stand for ‘is a schproton’, then in words (BF) says: if schprotons are 
possible then something is a possible schproton. In this instance the 
consequent of (BF) asserts the existence of something with the modal 
property of being a possible schproton.  
 
                                                
8 Linsky and Zalta (1994), Williamson (1998)  
9 Marcus (1946) 
10 There are of course controversies surrounding the Barcan Formula, which I discuss below.  
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When nothing satisfies a condition, ϕ, which cannot be satisfied contingently, 
commitment to the relevant instance of (BF), in conjunction with actualism 
implies the general impossibility of a ϕ. Since kind membership cannot be 
born contingently11, (BF) implies the impossibility of any kinds of thing other 
than those that there actually are. Hence, assuming there are in fact no 
schprotons and given that schprotonhood cannot be born contingently, it is not 
the case that there exists a possible schproton – any possible schproton would 
have to be an actual schproton, contrary to our original stipulation that there 
are no schprotons. Thus, from (BF) and Modus Tollens we can infer that it is 
not the case that there could have been schprotons, because nothing satisfies 
the consequent of (BF) in this instance.  
 
In conjunction with scientific essentialism, the impossibility of alien kinds 
implies the impossibility of any laws other than those present at our world, 
and this, I argue, is needed to counter the concerns of the previous section.  
 
There are, however, conditions besides natural kind membership, which 
cannot be satisfied contingently. An example is the condition being a child of 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein fathered no children and nothing is a possible child 
of his because if it were then it would be an actual child of his, given the 
essentiality of origin12. So in this case a commitment to the relevant instance 
of (BF) implies that it is impossible that Wittgenstein fathered a child because 
nothing is a possible child of his.   
 
But surely Wittgenstein could have fathered a child. This general possibility 
would then seem to require the rejection of one of (BF), actualism or 
essentialism. The possibilist can maintain that although nothing in the actual 
world is a possible child of Wittgenstein, he may nonetheless have fathered a 
child at some other possible world, and that this merely possible child satisfies 
the consequent of (BF). The actualist, by contrast, has no recourse to mere 
possibilia, which has led some to try and invalidate (BF)13 or else reconceive 
                                                
11 See part 1 above. 
12 Kripke (1972/ 1980) 
13 E.g. Kripke (1963) 
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our modal semantics such that it does not commit us to the existence of mere 
possibilia14. 
 
Putting controversies aside momentarily, for now it will suffice to notice the 
relationship between actualism, essentialism and (BF) on the one hand and the 
denial of alien kinds on the other. A full survey of the reasons why one would 
want to be an actualist as opposed to a possibilist would be beyond the scope 
of this essay, but the result that alien kinds are impossible, given (BF) and 
essentialism, can be shown without explicit reference to actualism or 
possibilism15, which is indicative of how commonplace and plausible the 
characteristically ‘actualist’ assumptions required for the result are. 
Furthermore, the scientific essentialist’s endowment of her ontological 
bedrock with primitive modalities in the form of dispositional properties was 
motivated by a distain for ‘reductive’ accounts of modality, which engender 
commitment to entities outside of actuality16. And given the subject of this 
paper, no independent discussion of essentialism is required – primarily I 
want to argue that the scientific essentialist can offer a principled denial of 
alien kinds, which can reasonably involve appeal to characteristically 
scientific essentialist sentiments. However, I shall discuss the plausibility of 
commitment to instances of (BF) and, crucially, its purported 
counterexamples shortly.  
 
My intention is to offer this context – actualism, essentialism and (BF) – to 
supplement scientific essentialism and then to explore the details of how it 
will serve to bolster the view. This context can be thought of as being offered 
in response to the question: besides providing a patch to scientific 
essentialism, why would anyone want to deny the possibility of, say, 
schprotons? To which I respond, a commitment to three independently 
plausible theses implies such denial. The point is that the scientific 
essentialist’s denial of alien kinds need not be seen as a knee-jerk or ad hoc 
response to the criticisms of the previous section. Rather, those criticisms can 
                                                
14 Linsky and Zalta (1994, 1996), Williamson (1998) 
15 E.g. Williamson (1998) 
16 E.g. Lewis (1986) 
 71 
be seen as motivating the essentialist to think seriously about embedding her 
view within a highly plausible logical-metaphysical context. Once this context 
is fully elucidated, I shall offer some broad reasons as to why the scientific 
essentialist should find it more accommodating than, say, the Humean and 
conclude with some general remarks about the attractiveness of the resulting 
modal necessitarianism17.  
 
In what follows I shall present a survey of the reasons, logical and 
metaphysical, in favour of commitment to instances of (BF). I shall then 
consider how the different interpretations of a commitment to instances of 
(BF) that preserve actualism and essentialism found in Linsky and Zalta18 and 
Williamson19, on the one hand, and Simchen20 on the other, bear on the current 
proposal; that alien kinds and laws are impossible. I shall then move on to 
discuss how these interpretations relate to our current interest in 
supplementing scientific essentialism. 
 
 
3.5) The Logical Case for the Barcan Formula 
 
Linsky and Zalta (1994) and Williamson (1998) advocate logical systems 
(SQML and LPC=S5, respectively) that result from the addition of modal 
operators to first order logic in arguably the simplest, most straightforward 
manner. From the resulting axiomatization of the “simplest and strongest 
sensible quantified modal logic”21 the Barcan Formula and its converse are 
derivable as theorems governing the interaction between the quantifiers and 
the modal operators. Thus one popular argument for (BF) proceeds by 
emphasizing the theoretical virtues of a logical system from which it is 
derivable.  
 
                                                




20 (2006, 2013) 
21 Williamson (1998) 
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However, concerns were raised by apparent counterexamples to (BF) or the 
threat that it posed to actualism – these problems are really two sides of the 
same coin. Whether one frames the concern as a threat to actualism or as the 
presence of counterexamples to (BF) depends on what is held fixed. Thus 
Williamson, unwilling to engage directly in what he sees to be a highly 
confused debate between possibilists and actualists resulting from the weasel 
word ‘exists’22, apparently assumes what some may dub ‘actualism’ because 
he does not think a meaningful distinction can be drawn between ‘being 
actual’ and ‘existing’. Hence for Williamson the concern raised by the 
possibility that Wittgenstein fathered a child is that this poses a 
counterexample to (BF), which is a theorem of an elegant and powerful 
logical system. Linksy and Zalta, on the other hand, are concerned with 
rendering the simplest quantified modal logic (SQML) metaphysically neutral 
between possibilism and actualism. Thus their emphasis is on the threat that 
(BF) poses to actualism, given such possibilities as Wittgenstein fathering a 
child and the apparent ease with which possibilism accounts for these 
possibilities and validates (BF). Either way, (BF), and hence the otherwise 
theoretically virtuous quantified modal logic of which it is a theorem, appear 
under threat.  
 
In light of these concerns, the project of invalidating the Barcan Formula 
gained interest. It was hoped that quantified modal logic could be axiomatized 
such that (BF), along with other actualistically objectionable theorems of 
SQML, were not derivable and that this could be represented semantically. 
Kripke’s innovation with respect to the semantics was the introduction of 
variable domains. By assigning each world of a model its own domain, 
Kripke was able to semantically invalidate (BF). So while it may be possible 
that Wittgenstein fathered a child: ◊∃xAx, it can nonetheless be false, on a 
variable domains semantics, that anything, where ‘anything’ is relativized to 
some world of the model, is a possible child of Wittgenstein: ~(∃x◊Ax).  
 
                                                
22 Ibid.  
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The modal operator ‘◊’ ranges over worlds, whereas the existential quantifier 
‘∃’ ranges over individuals, with its scope is relativized to worlds. That is to 
say, with respect to the existential quantifier, the domain of quantification 
varies from world to world, which supposedly captures the intuition that what 
there is, is a contingent matter. The modal operators, on the other hand, 
quantify over possible worlds and the scope of this quantification can be 
maximal, or restricted via the invocation of an accessibility function. Thus it 
may be true at some world, call it w, that Wittgenstein could have fathered a 
child because in some world, call it v, accessible23 from w Wittgenstein is not 
childless. This is what is meant by ◊∃xAx. However, it is false at w that 
anything is a possible child of Wittgenstein. The possible child of 
Wittgenstein at v is outside the range of the quantifier ‘∃’ in ‘∃x◊Ax’, which 
ranges only over individuals at w, hence this instance of ∃x◊Ax is false and 
(BF) is semantically invalidated by this counterexample, among others.  
 
Kripke was now tasked with blocking the derivation of (BF) from the axioms 
of quantified modal logic to ensure the soundness of his system, which he 
does by rejecting the following instance of the rule of universal instantiation: 
 ∀1: ∀xAx → Ay  
 
But as it happens, without ∀1 the axiomatization of quantified modal logic 
becomes considerably harder and the expressive power of the language is 
compromised. Suffice it to say that invalidating (BF) comes at a high cost to 
the theoretical utility of the system. Thus Williamson complains: “such 
complications are a warning sign of philosophical error”24. But this sentiment 
embeds a controversial stance. It is by no means immediately obvious that 
elegance or expressive power of a purely formal system need be taken to 
indicate (approximate) truth; different formal systems may be employed for 
different computational purposes.  
 
                                                
23 It doesn’t matter for present purposes whether or not all worlds are accessible from all 
others.  
24 (1998: 262) 
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However, there are reasons besides the cumbersome nature of its 
axiomatization for rejecting Kripke’s quantified modal logic. Bearing in mind 
that the motivation for adopting Kripke’s semantics, which invalidate (BF), 
came from the observation that some instances of (BF) appear to demand 
mere possibilia, a sense of dissatisfaction lingers with the counterexamples to 
(BF) that Kripke models provide. But what is it about the details of the above 
counterexample that fails to spark our enthusiasm? According to Williamson25 
the problem is that the very statement of the counterexample to (BF) requires 
quantification over individuals not in the domain of the distinguished member 
of the set of worlds with which we are concerned: 
 
“On the relativized domains approach, the meta-linguistic statement 
that (BF) has false instances implies that something in the domain of 
some world is not in the domain of the actual world. But the latter is 
true only if the domain of ‘something’ in the metalanguage is not 
restricted to the domain of the actual world”26.  
 
Williamson continues to argue that since the restriction on quantifiers in the 
object language must not apply to quantifiers in the metalanguage, that 
restriction looks arbitrary.  
 
Thus, we can frame the debate as follows. Since (BF) would appear to 
demand possibilia, it is arguably in our interests as actualists to invalidate 
(BF). Kripke semantics invalidate (BF) but are committed to possibilia 
elsewhere. Thus we should not embrace Kripke’s semantic invalidation of 
(BF), because that semantics does not absolve us of a commitment to 
possibilia, which was the whole reason for wanting to invalidate (BF) in the 
first place. Kripke’s formal system, which blocks the derivation of (BF), is 
cumbersome and its semantic underpinning still requires possibilia. We thus 
lack grounds besides the intuitive force of the informal counterexamples to 
give up (BF). Furthermore, if we are of the Williamsonian mindset that 
elegance and expressive power of formal systems should be read as an 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 (1998: 263) 
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indication of truth, then the fact that those systems from which (BF) is 
derivable have these desirable features may be cited in a positive argument for 
(BF).  
 
This concludes my brief sketch of the case for the Barcan Formula from 
logical considerations, but it is inconclusive insofar as we are interested in the 
metaphysical import of (BF). Purported problem cases for (BF) would still 
appear to retain their intuitive force despite it being shown that Kripke 
semantics cannot underpin them. In what follows I shall discuss the 
metaphysical repercussions of reconciling instances of (BF) with such 
possibilities as Wittgenstein fathering a child.  
  
 
3.6) (BF) as a Metaphysical Principle  
 
Of more relevance to our current concerns than the purely logical 
considerations in favour of (BF), or at least counter its proposed logical 
invalidity, would be the metaphysical thesis that possibility in general cannot 
float free from what is possible for the particular things. A mere commitment 
to instances of the schema ◊∃xAx → ∃x◊Ax on logical grounds does not have 
unambiguous metaphysical import. More must be said about how, 
metaphysically, we are to interpret (BF) if it is to provide the required context 
for the denial of possible alien kinds.  
 
Following Marcus when she says: “Modalities in their primary use concern 
counterfactuals about actual objects”27 and keeping in mind the interpretation 
of Marcus’ dictum offered at the start of this section, it would not seem 
unreasonable to maintain that possibility in general ought to be constrained by 
what is possible for the actual things. And in our post-Kripkean philosophical 
landscape (particularly the region encompassing the scientific extension of 
essentialism currently under scrutiny) the actual things seem capable of 
imposing a fair amount of constraint in this respect. If, for example, I say 
                                                
27 Ibid 
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“there could have been talking donkeys”, you may reasonably disagree with 
me, since it has become apparent that the class of sentences expressing 
necessary truths is not coextensive with those true in virtue of the meanings of 
their non-logical terms. Hence, the sentences that state genuine possibilities 
are not all those that do not express a logical contradiction, some logically 
consistent sentences nonetheless express metaphysical impossibilities, such as 
‘water is XYZ’. With this in mind, your reasoning may proceed along the 
following lines: it is not possible for any of the actual donkeys that they could 
talk and neither is it possible for any of the non-donkeys that they could be 
donkeys, let alone talking ones. Therefore, it is not possible after all that there 
be talking donkeys. Your response can be viewed as a demand for some 
principled basis for our modal assertions; a requirement that possibilities 
obtain in virtue of something. And insofar as that something is a part of our 
‘robust reality28’ we also have an explanation of why we should care about 
modality in the first place – because it concerns familiar, everyday things apt 
for investigation by scientific methods.  
 
What is more, on this account, the epistemology of modality may be 
assimilated by familiar scientific epistemology, since it is scientific inquiry, as 
opposed to speculative metaphysics, that is best placed to discern the essences 
of things in the world and hence the constraints on possibility. This line of 
thought gives primacy to modality de re because it is maintained that the 
obtaining of a de dicto possibility can be explained by reference to what is 
possible for some particular thing or other. What is more, the Barcan Formula 
construed thusly as a bridge principle between modality de dicto and modality 
de re29, gives expression to this primacy of de re modality in the order of 
metaphysical explanation. Hence, insofar as we are persuaded by the presently 
espoused interpretation of Marcus’ quote above we appear to have good 
reason to adopt (BF) as a metaphysical principle30.  
 
                                                
28 See Russell (1919) 
29 See also Simchen (2013) 
30 Simchen (2013) offers a similar line of reasoning.  
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By arguing that all possibilities must have some ‘witness’ in actuality, we 
seek to shift the explanatory burden onto he who thinks that possibility 
abounds. One resounding influence of Quine through Lewis is the idea that 
possibility is cheap, if you like, and necessity expensive. But this results from 
scepticism about the cogency of essentialism31 and an adherence to Humean 
supervenience, respectively. However, with the plausibility of essentialism 
widely accepted and the scientific essentialist metaphysic offering an 
attractive alternative to Humean supervenience, it would seem appropriate to 
shift the burden of explanation on to the contingentist to explain in virtue of 
what his plethora of fanciful possibilities obtain.   
 
I have discussed broad metaphysical considerations and formal logical 
considerations in favour of a commitment to instances of (BF). But we have 
yet to tackle head on the prima facie counterexamples to (BF), which would 
appear to be the main sticking point for anyone wishing to maintain the 
presently advocated metaphysical import in (BF). I suggested that it would not 
be unreasonable to deny the general possibility of talking donkeys by arguing 
from considerations of the impossibility for any particular thing that it be a 
talking donkey. The plausibility of this reasoning, which I am suggesting is 
enshrined in (BF), appears to cause a problem if we return to the example of 
Wittgenstein’s child. Whereas to deny the general possibility of talking 
donkeys would not appear wholly unreasonable, to deny that Wittgenstein 
could possibly have fathered a child does seem wrong. So long as we are 
interested in, at least minimally, respecting our intuitions on matters modal, 
something will have to be said about the appearance of this general possibility 
(and others32) that would appear to constitute a counterexample to (BF).  
 
 
3.7) Proxy Actualism 
 
                                                
31 E.g., Quine (1953) 
32 For example, the possibility that there be an additional carbon atom.  
 78 
The most prominent response to this problem can be found in the work of 
Linksy and Zalta (1994) and Williamson (1998) (independently, apparently). 
Their solution to the issue of reconciling (BF) with actualism and essentialism 
involves introducing a category comprising what Linsky and Zalta call 
contingently nonconcretia. According to this view, which I shall call proxy 
actualism, and contrary to what had previously been assumed, the property 
concreteness need not be borne by an actually concrete individual in every 
world in which that individual exists and essential properties are reconceived 
of as those that an individual bears in every possible world in which it is 
concrete.  
 
The proxy actualist accepts the general possibility that, e.g., Wittgenstein 
fathered a child, among other prima facie problematic general possibilities for 
(BF). Furthermore, they accept that none of the concrete things could possibly 
have been a child of Wittgenstein but they nonetheless deny that nothing in 
actuality, concrete or nonconcrete, satisfies the consequent of this instance of 
(BF). Embracing the implication from (BF) and the possibility that 
Wittgenstein fathered a child, they maintain that Wittgenstein’s possible child 
is just that: a contingently nonconcrete possible child of Wittgenstein, 
something that is such that if it were concrete, it would be a child of 
Wittgenstein. Contingently nonconcretia play a role analogous to the 
possibilist’s mere possibilia, except that they actually exist, and the 
quantifiers of the language (SQML/ LPC=S5) range over all individuals 
concrete and nonconcrete. Nonconcretia, much like abstract objects33 
(numbers, sets, etc.) occupy no spatiotemporal location, hence Williamson 
concludes:  
 
“…there are no counterexamples to (BF), only counterexamples to the 
different claim that if there could have been something in space and time 
that was such and such (e.g. fathered by Wittgenstein), then there is 
something in space and time that could have been such and such.”34 
 
                                                
33 Williamson (2013) distinguishes between the abstract and the contingently nonconcrete.  
34 (1998: 266) 
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The majority of the arguments in favour of proxy actualism begin with 
actualism as non-negotiable and centre on extoling the virtues of a logical 
system of which the Barcan Formula is a theorem whilst highlighting 
theoretical shortcomings of those systems that would invalidate it. These 
arguments were touched on above in my discussion of the logical 
considerations in favour of (BF). Thus it is argued that the introduction of 
contingently nonconcretia is justified because it allows us to retain the 
theoretical utility of the simplest quantified modal logic and accompanying 
fixed domain semantics without recourse to mere possibilia, which offend 
actualist sensibilities.  
 
Proxy actualism is interesting for our current purposes since it provides a way 
of rebutting counterexamples, such as the possibility that Wittgenstein 
fathered a child, to the context; actualism, essentialism and (BF), which it has 
been suggested will make for a principled denial of possible alien kinds. But 
this context has been altered by the introduction of contingently nonconcretia. 
So next I shall turn my attention to the question of how, if at all, we may deny 
the possibility of alien kinds given proxy actualism.   
 
 
3.8) Contingently Nonconcrete Alien Kinds?  
 
I have been arguing that the denial of possible alien kinds would bolster a 
scientific essentialist account of natural law by blocking the objections 
discussed in section 2. To the extent that proxy actualism strengthens the case 
for (BF) as a metaphysical principle it may appear apt to feature in an 
argument for the context that I require to deny the possibility of alien kinds. 
Indeed, proxy actualism provides a way of rebutting prima facie 
counterexamples to (BF) as a metaphysical principle and so appears to serve 
our broader purpose in this respect. However, the introduction of contingently 
nonconcretia would seem to provide a means of rebutting counterexamples to 
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(BF)35 only at the cost of depriving (BF), actualism and essentialism of the 
ability to strictly imply the impossibility of schprotons et al.  
 
So long as we retain the classical and intuitive notion of essential properties as 
those possessed by an individual in every world in which it exists and retain a 
robust sense of reality36, the conjunction of (BF), actualism and essentialism 
implies the impossibility of alien kinds. However, with the introduction of the 
proxy actualist’s vestiges, which can satisfy the consequent of (BF) in 
problematic cases and the accompanying reconception of essential properties 
as those born by an individual in every world in which it is concrete, the 
impossibility of alien kinds no longer follows plainly from our context. Proxy 
actualism, though it preserves (BF), actualism and essentialism, does not 
eliminate the possibility of alien kinds, since it allows for the possibility of 
actually existing contingently nonconcrete entities that would satisfy the 
consequent of an instance of (BF) whose antecedent says that there could have 
been schprotons. So, given proxy actualism, is there a way to consistently 
allow for possible children of Wittgenstein whilst disallowing possible alien 
kinds?  
 
Maybe, again following Marcus37, and in the interest of heeding Russell’s 
caution, we could argue that since modality in its primary use concerns the 
possible configurations of actual things, robustly construed, we have no 
reason to think that there could possibly be, say, schprotons and so no need to 
postulate contingently nonconcrete schprotons or any other possible alien 
kinds. Thus, it may be argued with respect to Wittgenstein possibly fathering 
a child versus the possibility of schprotons that the former, and not the latter, 
possibility pertains to a part of robust reality. The former pertains to 
Wittgenstein and says that he could have stood in the fatherhood relation, the 
postulation of a contingently nonconcrete possible child of his is then 
warranted. However, the possibility that there be schprotons says nothing 
                                                
35 As a metaphysical principle: when I refer to (BF) I mean as a metaphysical principle in the 
sense argued for according to which modality de re takes primacy over modality de dicto in 
the order of metaphysical explanation.  
36 Mere possibilia and contingently nonconcretia run counter to this requirement.  
37 (1995) 
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about what is possible for anything so tangible and so there is no demand to 
introduce possible schprotons.  
 
However, the very introduction of contingently nonconcretia constitutes an 
abandonment of a Russellian robust sense of reality in matters modal. Hence, 
arguments throughout this section to the effect that possibility in general 
ought to be constrained by how the actual things may be configured cannot 
consistently be invoked to argue that there could be no contingently 
nonconcrete thing that is possibly a schproton, whilst admitting contingently 
nonconcretia elsewhere. To say that, with respect to modality, primary 
concern with how the actual things could be, should lead us to the belief that it 
is not possible in general that there be schprotons and hence that nothing is a 
contingently nonconcrete possible schproton would be inconsistent with 
admitting contingently nonconcretia to validate other instances of (BF). This 
is because to admit contingently nonconcretia epitomizes the abandonment of 
a robust sense of reality in matters modal and so we cannot consistently 
appeal to this Russellian admonition to determine how many contingently 
nonconcrete things there are, unless the answer was none.  
 
I can think of one other possible strategy for reaping the benefits of proxy 
actualism’s support for (BF) as a metaphysical principle by admitting possible 
children of Wittgenstein whilst simultaneously denying possible schprotons 
etc. The possibility that Wittgenstein fathered a child was posed as a 
counterexample to (BF) as a metaphysical principle. In order to properly 
constitute a counterexample, it should be widely agreed that it really is 
possible that Wittgenstein fathered a child. Indeed this prima facie 
counterexample to (BF) seems highly plausible, so let’s assume for now that it 
holds up and hence that the introduction of a contingently nonconcrete 
possible child of Wittgenstein is warranted. What is less obvious than the 
possibility that Wittgenstein fathered a child is the possibility that there be 
schprotons. Thus, if we disagree that schprotons are a possibility then we have 




In common with the previous suggestion, this involves admitting some 
apparent general possibilities and denying others. Unsurprisingly, the 
possibilities we will deny will be those that require possible alien kinds. But 
instead of appealing to the idea that general possibility must nonetheless be 
constrained by actuality, robustly construed, this would be a straightforward 
appeal to intuition, without any broader supporting principles that would risk 
conflicting elsewhere with the concept of contingently nonconcretia. Strong 
modal intuitions drove the postulation of a contingently nonconcrete possible 
child of Wittgenstein, but it is likely that there is no such intuitive force 
present that should impel us towards postulating the existence of possible 
schprotons. Proxy actualism doesn’t itself imply that there are possible 
schprotons; it simply provides a framework from within which to validate 
statements of general possibility to this effect. It still remains unclear what the 
intuitive consensus is on the possibility of schprotons, and thus what work our 
would-be semantics has to do here.  
 
This latter strategy seems an odd one. The whole point of promoting a 
commitment to (BF) as a metaphysical principle was to provide an 
independent reason for denying the possibility of alien kinds, lest the proposal 
look like a mere ad hoc appendage to scientific essentialism. But if the extoled 
context no longer has the implication that we require, as would seem to be the 
case when proxy actualism is adopted, then we are back to unprincipled mere 
stipulation or arguments from intuition in order to maintain the impossibility 
of alien kinds.  
 
 
3.9) Possible Propagation 
 
While the formal arguments forwarded by Linsky and Zalta and Williamson 
for a commitment to instances of (BF) help us to the extent that we at least 
require the formal validity of (BF), ultimately our present interests are 
frustrated by the full metaphysical import of proxy actualism. Thus, armed 
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with compelling formal arguments from theoretical utility, and the broad 
metaphysical reasons in favour of (BF) from considerations of the primacy of 
modality de re in the order of metaphysical explanation, we should 
nonetheless resist the introduction of contingently nonconcretia. As argued, 
this postulate would run counter to our desire to ground modality in reality, 
robustly construed, and thus to allow for the assimilation of the epistemology 
of modality to scientific epistemology. Contingently nonconcretia, unlike 
concrete tokens of kinds, are not the sort of thing that we can find out about 
via science, and hence could not feature in a naturalized account of laws and 
modality38.  
 
With the rejection of proxy actualism, we are challenged to provide an 
alternative response to counterexamples to (BF). I have argued that there are 
good reasons to adhere to instances of the schema, according to which if 
possibly something satisfies a condition φ, then something possibly satisfies 
φ, and to interpret this as giving expression to the primacy of modality de re 
in the order of metaphysical explanation. But the highly plausible claim 
(among others) that it is possible that Wittgenstein fathered a child would 
seem to constitute a counterexample to this principle. Nothing is a possible 
child of Wittgenstein, thus (BF) and Modus Tollens imply that it is not 
possible that there be a child of Wittgenstein.  
 
In the face of prima facie counterexamples to (BF), following Simchen39, I 
suggest that instead of denying the seeming absence of any possible φs, as the 
proxy actualists do, we instead embrace appearances and the implication from 
(BF) and hence deny the general possibility that something φs. So, in the 
above case, we would deny the general possibility that there be a child of 
Wittgenstein, because it is not possible for anything to be a child of 
Wittgenstein. The apparent possibility that Wittgenstein fathered a child can 
then be explained, not by appeal to the possibility that there be a child of his, 
which does not obtain, but by the real possibility that something, or things 
                                                
38 See also Simchen (2006) fn 11, for an independent philosophical concern with Proxy 
Actualism’s treatment of concreteness.  
39 (2006, 2012) 
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jointly, became or propagated a child of his. Purported counterexamples to 
(BF) are then rebutted by diagnosing the appearance of possibility that 
something satisfy φ, in problematic cases, as confusing the real possibility for 
something(s) to propagate a φ, with the spurious possibility for something to 
satisfy φ. Thus, while it is true that some genetic material of the past could 
have propagated a child of Wittgenstein, it is not the case that this material, or 
anything else, is a possible child of Wittgenstein. Analogously, an acorn is not 
a possible oak tree, but it does have the potential to become an oak tree, i.e., it 
is a possible propagator of an oak tree.  
 
The Barcan Formula is then followed with respect to possible propagation. 
Thus, if it is possible that something(s) propagate a φ, then something(s) 
possibly propagate a φ. The sense in which it is possible that Wittgenstein 
fathered a child, then, is that it is possible that something(s) propagated a 
child of his and hence it is possible for some actual things, i.e. his genetic 
material, that they propagated a child of his. The possibility that there be, say, 
an additional carbon atom also typically posed a problem for (BF). But on the 
current account this is possible in the sense that it is possible for some thing(s) 
to propagate an additional carbon atom. And this is not to say that anything 
could have propagated some additional matter, just that the matter that there is 
could be reconfigured so as to give rise to an additional carbon atom, as 
indeed occurs in stars.  
 
The invocation of unactualised potentialities in this way should appeal to the 
scientific essentialist who is ready to admit irreducible dispositions into her 
ontology. There is no requirement that these possible propagators of φs ever 
realise their potential just as there is no requirement that genuine dispositional 
properties ever manifest their dispositions, or that they be fully analyzable in 
terms of conditionals. Potentialities, like dispositions, may be viewed as part 
of the modal bedrock of our broad picture. The bullet that the scientific 
essentialist bites is that of admitting irreducible modalities into her ontology, 
which pays its dues by absolving us of any requirement to ground natural 
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necessity somehow outside of actuality, whatever that may mean40. Thus the 
presence of potential propagators of φs, need not commit us to the existence 
of merely possible φs, just as, on the current view, the presence of 
dispositional properties does not commit us to merely possible worlds in 
which the disposition manifests41. The general idea is that by admitting 
irreducible modalities into our ontology42, as the scientific essentialist already 
does elsewhere, possible propagators of φs demand no recourse to shadowy 
possible φs, that can claim no right to residence in robust reality.   
 
But is it possible that anything propagate a schproton? It certainly would not 
seem as if there are any possible propagators of schprotons. Consider the 
continuing presence of actual carbon atoms and human children; this would 
appear to constitute good evidence for the existence of possible propagators of 
carbon atoms and of children, some of which realise their potential as possible 
propagators, giving rise to the atoms and children we observe. Children and 
atoms at least raise the probability of there being such propagators, since it 
seems more likely that these things are propagated, in a sense, that that they 
spontaneously and immediately come into existence out of nothing. And 
indeed it does turn out to be the case that there are possible propagators of 
children and of carbon atoms in the form of subatomic particles and human 
genetic material. Thus, The presence of actual schprotons would be good 
evidence for there being possible propagators of schprotons. On the other 
hand, a good explanation for the absence of schprotons, then, is that our world 
with its particular laws is not such that schprotons are possible, in any sense, 
and hence that there are no possible propagators of schprotons43.  
To respond that there may be possible propagators of schprotons at other 
worlds would be to ignore the forgoing argument against the possibility of 
                                                
40 Ellis (2001: 40) 
41 See Simchen (2012: 390-391) for formal argument to the conclusion that a commitment to 
possible propagators of φ does not entail commitment to possible φs.  
42 See e.g. Williamson (2000: 204); Williamson challenges the preconception that the modal 
must somehow be grounded in or reducible to the nonmodal. He makes this point with respect 
to irreducibly modal properties of contingently nonconcretia, but there is no reason not to thus 
extend the point so as to maintain that concretia too can have modal properties that are not 
grounded in nonmodal properties. See also Bird (2007) for defense of dispositional monism, 
according to which all properties are dispositional.   
43 Bird (2001) argues that what substances there are depends on what laws there are.  
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alien kinds. Just as we require some principled basis in actuality to sustain the 
general possibility of schprotons, so would we require some principled basis 
in actuality to sustain the general possibility of possible propagators of 
schprotons. So the foregoing arguments against the general possibility of 
schprotons can be extended to apply to the general possibility of possible 
propagators of schprotons44. 
 
Schprotons, like all alien kinds, are the product of philosophical imagination; 
there is no empirical evidence to suggest their possible existence. We may be 
able to imagine schprotons, but in the interest of respecting naturalism, it is 
reasonable to give minimal weight to intuition or imaginings when 
considering what there is or could be. Indeed, science would seem to tell 
against there being possible propagators of schprotons because the actual 
world just does not seem to be such that it could possibly yield this imagined 
kind45. So why think that there are propagators of schprotons any more than 
we would think it really possible that straw could be spun into gold in the 
patent absence of any really possible straw-spinner setup that would turn the 
straw into gold? The burden should be on the contingentist to identify such 
propagators. Until then, it seems reasonable to maintain that there are no such 
things.  
 
If there are no (possible) possible propagators of schprotons (or any other 
alien kinds), which I suggest is eminently plausible, then the current proposal 
suits our needs where proxy actualism failed; it allows us to account for the 
apparent possibility that Wittgenstein fathered a child, whilst consistently 
denying the possibility of schprotons.  
 
 
3.10) Modal Necessitarianism  
 
                                                
44 Though the qualification with this line of argument, as with the arguments above, is that 
this is something that the scientific essentialist could at least consistently maintain – some 
scientific essentialist sympathies are assumed.  
45 Ibid.  
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Broad considerations of the nature of modality, constrained by a desire to 
heed the admonition of Russell that we retain a robust sense of reality, have 
provided good reasons in favour of a commitment to instances of (BF) as a 
metaphysical principle. Furthermore, the formal validity of (BF) follows from 
a simple yet powerful system of quantified modal logic and alternative 
systems, which invalidate (BF), are somewhat unwieldy and their semantic 
underpinning of counterexamples to (BF) proved unconvincing. Thus we have 
good independent reasons, consistent with the motivations of scientific 
essentialism, to deny the possibility of alien kinds, since this is implied by the 
resulting commitment to, and favoured interpretation of, (BF).  
 
The scientific essentialist is particularly well placed to embrace the espoused 
necessitarianism. The Humean, for example, would likely deny that 
modalities in their primary use concern counterfactuals about actual 
objects46, since for them what constitutes the actual world and how its 
constituents happen to be is of no special relevance, due to the assumed lack 
of necessary connections between distinct existences and hence irrelevance of 
what is actual to what is possible. Thus, the forgoing arguments for 
necessitarianism assume scientific essentialist sympathies, but this does 
nothing to diminish the point that the scientific essentialist can offer a 
principled denial of possible alien kinds. This suggestion is no mere ad hoc 
appendage; rather it follows from independently plausible considerations 
consistent with prior motivations for scientific essentialism. For example, we 
required a metaphysic capable of underwriting the laws’ support for 
counterfactuals, and which reflected the interconnectedness of the 
fundamental reality that science is revealing47. This involved postulating 
essential, irreducibly dispositional properties. This essentialism, coupled with 
                                                
46 Marcus (1995). We also read in Marcus (1971: 69) the following: “Being gold or being a 
human are not accidental… No metaphysical mysteries. Such essences are dispositional 
properties of a very special kind: if an object had such a property and ceased to have it, it 
would have ceased to exist or it would have changed into something else”. This endorsement 
of essentialism would seem to directly feed the thought that “modalities in their primary use 
concern counterfactuals about actual objects”, since we must consult the things themselves 
in order to properly tell how things (in general) could possibly be.   
47 Ellis (2001: 52) 
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(and motivated by) a reluctance to admit mere possibilia48 and a commitment 
to (BF), implies the impossibility of alien kinds. So to the extent that 
necessitarianism is attractive, scientific essentialism should be more attractive 
than Humeanism, since the former, but not the latter, can consistently embrace 
necessitarianism in a non-ad hoc manner.  
 
The concerns of section 2 served to diminish the distance between scientific 
essentialism and Humeanism and hence to expose scientific essentialism to 
the recurrent criticisms leveled at Humeanism. While the scientific essentialist 
can maintain the required distance from and hence avoid the criticisms of 
Humeanism by denying the possibility of alien kinds, the Humean could not 
consistently embrace modal necessitarianism. Besides not being able to 
consistently embrace the idea that modalities in their primary use concern 
counterfactuals about actual objects, for the aforementioned reasons, the 
Humean metaphysic seems intimately connected with an abandonment of a 
robust sense of reality in matters modal. Unless the Humean flatly denies the 
reality of modality in any sense whatsoever, the purely categorical mosaic of 
the actual world would demand reference to something outside of actuality to 
give meaning to our modal discourse. Insofar as the invocation of mere 
possibilia constitutes a failure to heed the Russellian admonition, a 
requirement to maintain a robust sense of reality cannot consistently be 
invoked to argue for the interpretation of (BF) that is required in order to deny 
possible alien kinds in a principled fashion.  
 
Following Schaffer49 and Wilson50, I refer to the view that all possible worlds 
are identical with respect to their laws as modal necessitarianism. Modal 
necessitarianism is implied by the conjunction of the scientific essentialist 
metaphysic with the impossibility of alien kinds, and blocks the concerns of 
the previous section. Modal necessitarianism has its defenders, such as 
Wilson, who51 in response to Schaffer’s52 critique of the view, argues that it is 
                                                
48 That the Humean picture seemed to demand such metaphysical commitments was among 





at least consistent53 and indeed appears to have desirable results in the domain 
of modal epistemology.  
 
If, as has been orthodox, we think of those possible worlds with the same laws 
of nature as the actual world as a proper subset of all possible worlds, then we 
may reasonably demand an explanation as to why this subset should be of 
more concern to us than any other. To stipulate that sameness of laws carries 
particular weight in determining similarity between worlds for the sake of 
evaluating counterfactuals is to provide no such explanation; it is simply to 
pass the buck on this matter. What remains is the question of why sameness of 
laws should carry the weight it does in determining similarity and hence in 
our counterfactual judgments. Why should natural necessity and the 
corresponding subset of worlds be of any more interest to us than, say, the 
subset corresponding to goldfish necessity? The contingentist may answer by 
citing certain pragmatic reasons for a particular interest in natural necessity. 
Natural necessity is certainly broader than goldfish necessity, the latter being 
a proper subset of the former, and natural necessity corresponds to the full 
breadth of humanity’s scientific and hence practical interests (we’d like to 
subsume our interests in goldfish and nuclear fusion, say, under some more 
inclusive set). But we may still question why our interests align in this way? 
Why is scientific inquiry (and hence our interest) particularly concerned with 
this set of worlds? To which the modal necessitarian can respond that this set 
is the set of all possible worlds; science is concerned with possibility 
simpliciter.  
 
Furthermore, an explanatory regress in the scientific domain may lead to a 
law proposition, for which we may request a further explanation. Any strategy 
that the contingentist may employ to meet this explanatory demand will 
compromise the ideological parsimony of their account, lest they just leave 
the laws unexplained. The modal necessitarian, on the other hand, has a 
response ready, striking in its elegance and which in no way serves to further 
                                                                                                                          
52 Ibid 
53 Bird (2004, 2007) also tentatively defends the view, which he calls strong necessitarianism 
with instantiation.  
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ideologically encumber their view, namely that the laws are the same in all 
possible worlds. Hence we are concerned with those worlds in which the laws 
are the same as ours because they are the only genuinely possible worlds, and 
the fact that any given law is how it is may be explained by appeal to the 
necessity of that law, it has to be and it has to be thus and so. No appeal to 
pragmatics or intuitions on the truth-values of counterfactuals54 must be made 
in order to provide these necessitarian explanations, which follow simply 
from the single proposition, which characterizes the view; that all possible 
worlds are identical with respect to their laws.  
 
For the contingentist, modal epistemology amounts to little more than the 
proffering of intuitions. The modal necessitarian, on the other hand, denies 
any pertinent conceivability-possibility link. Contra Schaffer55, this does not 
engender modal scepticism, since modal epistemology is assimilated to 
scientific epistemology. Physics is concerned with the most fundamental 
constituents of reality, their dispositional essences and hence the laws that 
emanate from them. Since it is maintained that the laws are metaphysically 
necessary and hence that metaphysical possibilities must be consistent with 
the laws, it is physics, not the imagination, which is our vessel of enquiry into 
what is metaphysically possible.   
 
I have argued that the scientific essentialist can consistently and in a 
principled manner deny the possibility of alien kinds by way of a response to 
the criticisms canvassed in section 2. Furthermore, the resulting modal 
necessitarianism also has independent appeal56, which cannot be consistently 
reaped by the Humean. But a strange result looms. For all that has been said 
thus far about scientific essentialism, the impossibility of alien kinds and the 
requirement that all worlds are identical with respect to their laws it is implied 
that kinds exist necessarily. Furthermore, no platonic conception of kinds, 
such that they may exist uninstantiated would serve our purposes, for much 
the same reason that our position could not consistently embrace proxy 
                                                
54 E.g. Lewis (1973, 1979) 
55 (2005: 26) 
56 And is consistent, see Bird (2004, 2007) and Wilson (2012) 
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actualism. So it must be maintained that kinds are instantiated in all possible 
worlds. This result is acknowledged by both Wilson and Bird57 and the 
general gist of Bird’s response is to maintain that it is only the force of 
intuition that could tell against such a thing, and the sway of intuition took a 
back seat in this line of inquiry a long time ago. According to Bird, intuition 
tells no more against strong necessitarianism with instantiation than it does 
against the simple metaphysical necessity of the laws that arises even without 
the necessary instantiation of kinds. Thus the suggestion would seem to be 
that if there are significant theoretical benefits to the necessary instantiation of 
kinds, then the mere charge that this is counterintuitive should have no sway.  
 
 
3.11) Conclusion  
 
I have argued that the most resilient formulation of scientific essentialism 
includes the following claims: i) the individual members of natural kinds bear 
their kind membership essentially and ii) alien kinds are impossible. Add this 
to the core principle that natural kinds are essentially characterized by 
irreducibly dispositional properties, from which the universal laws of nature 
may be derived, and we obtain the result that all possible words are identical 
with respect to their laws. I thus offer the preceding as an account of the 
metaphysical details and motivations for modal necessitarianism, which 
builds on the ideas of Bird58 and Wilson59.  
 
Arguments for the impossibility of alien kinds appeared equally to imply the 
impossibility of things required for eventualities that we would like to 
maintain are possible. For example, my arguments implied the impossibility 
of a child of Wittgenstein, which in turn implied that it was not possible that 
Wittgenstein fathered a child. Much of the argument for the impossibility of 
alien kinds was motivated by a desire to heed Russell’s admonition that we 
retain a robust sense of reality. Furthermore, the essentialist metaphysic 
                                                
57 In his discussion of Strong Necessitarianism (2004, 2007) 
58 (2007: 50-59) 
59 (2012) 
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appears to allow us to give meaning to our modal discourse whilst also 
respecting Russell in this respect. Thus, in lieu of any mere or bare possibilia, 
which would run counter to the Russellian admonition and the broader 
motivations of scientific essentialism, I appealed to Simchen’s idea of 
possible propagation60 to rebut purported counterexamples to the espoused 
interpretation of the Barcan Formula.   
 
For all that has been said it follows that natural kinds are necessary existents. 
If one finds this too big a bullet to bite, then the forgoing will likely be viewed 
as an elaborate reductio of scientific essentialism, or, if it is a bolstering of 
anything it will be of those criticisms of scientific essentialism canvassed in 
section 2. However, the necessity of kinds and resulting modal 
necessitarianism constitutes no logical contradiction, so we have no reductio 
in the strictest sense. Furthermore, our arguments for necessitarianism were 
rooted in the prior motivations for and particularities of the scientific 
essentialist metaphysic. So the counterintuitive nature of necessitarianism 
ought only bolster the criticisms of section 2 if one lacks sympathy for the 
aims or methods of scientific essentialism already. Anyone disinterested in 
endowing actuality with the necessity required to give meaning to our 
everyday as well as scientific discourse and thus in avoiding recourse to 
entities outside of actuality, is unlikely to find suasive much of what has been 
said. But for anyone concerned by the shortcomings of, say, Humeanism 
about laws and modality more generally, the preceding discussion may be 
seen as unifying, to some extent, a live alternative that is free of the problems 
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